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I. INTRODUCTION
CONTRACT law enforces assent-based contracts because they im-
prove welfare for both the parties and for society.' In a world
without transaction costs or frictions, parties can achieve optimal
outcomes on their own. 2
* John Homer Kapp Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law. Sincere thanks are due to Miranda Bureau, Brian Carney, Randeep Dhiman, Jeff
Dornbos and Michael Halper who provided valuable research assistance. Professors Omri
Ben-Shahar, Dick Craswell, Peter M. Gerhart, and Ronald J. Coffey provided valuable
comments. Thanks are also due to Dean Gary Simson and to the Case Western Reserve
Law School which provided research funds. The paper also benefited from presentation at
the American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, held May 16-17, 2008.
Final and heartfelt thanks are due to Eleanore Ettinger, whose technical assistance, en-
couragement, and supreme attention to detail made a significant contribution to this and
all my other articles.
1. This assumes no externalities.
2. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 15 (1960).
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In the real world, however, many frictions and impediments interfere
with the parties achieving optimal outcomes. Uncertainties of various
types impede parties as each decides whether to enter into a contract with
another party.3 Parties lack knowledge about their counterparty, specifi-
cally about their characteristics and qualities, including their propensity
to act opportunistically. 4 That uncertainty makes it difficult to achieve a
contract that expressly controls all of the possible permutations of the
risk of moral hazard.
5
The problem of uncertainty is pervasive in all contract negotiations.
Parties do not know what the probability of reaching an agreement is and
if so, whether it is worth expending costs to find out and up to what
point.6 Each potential party to a contract has a sense that the contract
will improve his welfare (and the welfare of society), and each is there-
fore optimistic abou't the possibility of a bargain. But that optimism is
tempered by three factors. First, each party knows that it cannot produce
joint gains from trade if it gives up too much.7 The party is therefore
uncertain about whether the other side will be asking too much to enter
into the deal. Second, each party knows that the success of the collabora-
tion depends on a variety of factors that require predictions as to the
future states of the world, including market conditions (or, more broadly,
conditions beyond the control of either party) and the decisions and ac-
tions of the other party.8 In general, uncertainty applies to one's own
ability to perform, the other party's ability to perform, and states of the
world that are unrelated to either party's ability to perform. Third, each
3. The decision to enter into a fully contingent contract is the ultimate decision, but
the parties could enter a number of preliminary agreements, including letters of intent and
agreements to agree. The legal treatment of these interim agreements will depend on a
number of factors. See infra text accompanying notes 161-169; see also E. Allan Farns-
worth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Nego-
tiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 221-243 (1987) (discussing different bases for liability in
precontractual negotiations including unjust enrichment, specific promise, misrepresenta-
tion, and general obligation).
4. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 47-49 (1985). For a recent treatment of the impor-
tant role that the problem of curbing opportunism plays in interpretation, see generally
Juliet P. Kostritsky, Plain Meaning v. Broad Interpretation: How the Risk of Opportunism
Defeats a Unitary Rule for Interpretation, 96 Ky. L.J. 43 (2007) (discussing opportunism
and contract interpretation).
5. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 48. For example, a principal hiring an agent
lacks fundamental knowledge about the agent's "propensity to diverge" and is uncertain
about the precise ways in which such "propensity" will manifest itself. Email from Ronald
J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, to Juliet
Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law (Jan. 27,
2005) (on file with author). This uncertainty poses a contracting problem for the principal
who cannot draft a complete contract to control for unknowable choices and predilections.
6. As Professors Hermalin, Katz and Craswell explain, "[iun order to conduct ex-
change, the parties must not only find each other, but they must also determine whether
trade is worthwhile." Benjamin Hermalin, Avery W. Katz & Richard Craswell, Contract
Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 3, 59 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell
eds., 2007). The search is to ascertain whether gains from trade exist.
7. See id.
8. WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 57.
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party is uncertain about its counterparty's particular proclivity to engage
in opportunistic behavior but knows that there is some potential for such
opportunistic behavior in the general population, as it is a facet of human
nature.9 The presence of certain structural factors affecting the sequence
of investment may increase the potential for opportunistic behavior. 10
The optimism of potential opportunities from joint gains from trade is
therefore tempered by the risk that a party will invest in reducing the
uncertainty only to find out that a bargain is not feasible, or that a bar-
gain that looked good (profitable) turns out to be bad (unprofitable), or
that he has made himself worse off by providing the other party with
information that the other party can use opportunistically." The law
grapples with this latter risk in precontractual negotiation cases 12 and, in
ways that will be explored later, the risk also exists in the reliance on
preliminary agreements where parties agree on a sequence of investment.
Some of these uncertainties, particularly those relating to the future,
may be resolved by negotiating with another party over time, since time
itself may resolve some issues. 13 Parties also can reduce uncertainty by
undertaking search costs and making expenditures to acquire
information. 14
Parties can also use the "courtship process" and proceed incrementally
to mitigate and resolve some of these uncertainties before they commit to
one another.' 5 Negotiating has costs, and parties will weigh the costs of
negotiating against the benefits to be derived from a deal that may or
may not be reached.' 6 During this initial period of uncertainty before a
contract is formed, each party must decide whether and when to make
9. The inability to know the exact degree to which a given party will act opportunisti-
cally makes it important to "expend[ ] resources to discriminate among types" in order to
achieve gains. Id. at 48. Williamson observes that this variance among types means that
"problems of economic organization are compounded if the propensity to behave oppor-
tunistically is known to vary among members of the contracting population. Id.
10. See id. at 58.
11. See Hermalin et al., supra note 6, at 59-61. An investment in general market infor-
mation may show that one bargain will not produce gains from trade but that a bargain
with a different partner would, so the investment in that information is not lost when the
first potential bargain is abandoned. That, of course, means that the incentive to produce
that kind of market information will not be decreased or threatened by the possibility that
a particular potential bargain will not work out.
12. Id. at 61.
13. See Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Es-
toppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1269 (1996) (discussing optimal
time to invest based on progressive reduction of uncertainty concerning certain variables
over time).
14. See Richard Craswell, Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Prob-
lenm, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 401, 403-04 (1988).
15. Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk Economics and
the Law of Contract Formation, 85 VA. L. REV. 385, 388 (1999). Johnston explains that
"courtship" is a "process by which markets for complex and highly differentiated goods
and services are created." Id. at 388.
16. Id. at 388-89. The possibility of reaching a deal will be the subject of a probability
distribution. This same basic analysis of optimal negotiating costs applies to all sorts of
costs incurred, including search costs for possible contracting partners. "From the perspec-
tive of a social planner, one would want the parties to undertake such efforts up to the
2008] 1379
SMU LAW REVIEW
investments of various kinds. If a deal is never reached, these invest-
ments may be lost forever. If a deal is reached, when and if each of the
parties has invested will determine how much of the surplus is available
for them to split.17 In turn, that prospect will affect their incentives to
invest in future negotiations and contracts.
Traditionally, under the aleatory view,' 8 the law took a "knife-edge"
approach to compensating for reliance investment that was most likely to
occur during this period of uncertainty. 19 That conventional approach
denied any compensation for reliance without a contract but granted full
enforcement to assent-based explicitly reciprocal contracts with consider-
ation. 20 Absent such a contract, any reliance investment was deemed
non-compensable. 21 Parties relied at their own peril in the absence of a
bargained-for contract. 22
Following the adoption of Section 90 of the Restatement (First) of Con-
tracts,23 courts adopted a more liberal approach to reliance compensation
issues. They sometimes found liability when a promisee relied on the
promises of a putative offeror despite the absence of a bargain in pre-
contractual negotiations without the benefit of any bargained-for agree-
ment.2 4 Hoffman v. Red Owl25 is the paradigm case permitting such re-
covery. Recently, courts have also begun to uphold reliance claims in
cases where parties reached a preliminary agreement together with an
agreement to invest simultaneously, one party had invested after the pre-
liminary agreement was reached, and the other party walked away from
the deal and refused to agree to a final contract.
26
Recently, two scholars, Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott, have cast
doubt on the liberal theory of reliance recovery.27 They argue that courts
generally deny recovery for reliance in cases involving precontractual
preliminary negotiation28 but grant recovery in cases involving reliance
point where the marginal costs of additional search just outweigh its expected marginal
value." Hermalin et al., supra note 6, at 53.
17. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuck & Omri Ben-Shahar, Precontractual Reliance, 30 J.
LEO. STUD. 423, 424 (2001). The contract itself "will stipulate how to divide the surplus
that will be generated in part by the reliance investments." Id.
18. Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 221. Under this view, investments made to win an
ultimate contract are done at one's peril. See infra Section III.
19. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agree-
ments, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 675 (2007).
20. Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 221-23. The contract price and expectancy damages
automatically compensate a party for his reliance expenditures since the contract price
includes an amount sufficient to cover one's reliance investment in the contract and in-
cludes a profit that exceeded the reliance investment. Id. at 223.
21. Id. at 221.
22. Id.
23. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
24. See Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 236-37.
25. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
26. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 662-65 (discussing the advent of such claims
under preliminary agreements and explaining the basis for success).
27. Id. at 663-65.
28. Id. at 673. Schwartz and Scott explain the lack of success in such preliminary nego-
tiation cases as follows: "The courts' reluctance to award damages in these cases may rest
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following a preliminary agreement. In this latter class of cases there is an
"emerging legal rule" that makes the promisor who breaches an obliga-
tion of good faith "liable for the promisee's reliance expenditures. '29
They identify a pattern in which success is likely and then provide an
analytical framework to justify liability. When parties reach a prelimi-
nary agreement that also includes an agreement that they both invest si-
multaneously 3 0-what I will refer to as agreements to jointly investigate
or explore-and one party strategically delays investment for personal
gain, the law permits the investing party to recover for reliance expendi-
tures when the other party walks away from the deal.31 Courts find the
party who exits the deal to be guilty of a breach of the good faith obliga-
tion that governs parties' actions in preliminary agreements. 32
Based on an extensive review of case law, this Article suggests that,
contrary to the Schwartz and Scott thesis, courts do grant recovery for
reliance expenditures made in precontractual preliminary negotiations
even when the parties have not reached "an agreement. '33 The courts'
willingness to do so depends on a pattern in which the promisor solicits
reliance expenditures to reduce uncertainty or to hedge his bets pending
the resolution of uncertainty and the promisee relies, particularly if the
reliance investment takes the form of a cooperative investment rather
than a selfish investment. 34 Neither the promisor nor the promisee would
want the promisor to have what amounts to an option that he does not
pay for if it would disincentivize promisees from investing and/or discour-
age trades.
The risk of holdup is present whenever there is sequential investment.
Once one party invests a sunk cost, one of two possibilities exist: either
the deal never materializes, in which case the sunk cost is lost, or the deal
materializes but the non-investing party shares in the surplus.35 That
need to share part of the surplus renders the investing party vulnerable to
holdup and discourages promisees from investing.36 Thus, this Article
suggests that courts are willing to grant recovery for reliance expenditures
in both categories of cases: (1) precontractual negotiations with no agree-
partly on the parties' ability to protect early reliance themselves by using alternative con-
tractual mechanisms. The cases thus raise the question why parties sometimes fail to use
these options." Id. at 693. My results are contrary and point to success in these cases
assuming the presence of a promise, a transaction-specific investment, detriment, and rea-
sonable reliance. See id. at 664-65. These results may be explained in part by the difficul-
ties that parties might have in drafting contractual protective mechanisms. See infra notes
127-28.
29. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 664-65.
30. As Schwartz and Scott point out, "neither the transaction nor what the parties are
to do is precisely described, and neither may be written down." Id. at 663.
31. Id. at 685 (discussing circumstances that will cause the party to delay investment).
32. Id. at 694.
33. See infra Section VI.
34. See Yeon-Koo Che & Donald B. Hausch, Cooperative Investments and the Value of
Contracting, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 125, 125 (1999) (defining "'cooperative' investments [as
ones] that directly benefit the investor's partner").
35. Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 17, at 423-24.
36. Id. at 431-32.
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ment and (2) reliance that follows a binding preliminary agreement. In
each set of cases, their willingness to do so is predicated on a framework
in which courts seek to control the problem of opportunistic behavior.
37
Presumably, both parties would want such control because the uncon-
trolled risk of such behavior would discourage future transactions. 38 That
framework connects the results of successful preliminary reliance negoti-
ation cases (the Hoffman v. Red Owl 39 type case) and the successful cases
of recovery for reliance on preliminary agreements with an agreement to
jointly invest, identified recently by Schwartz and Scott.40 Whether a
court is deciding if the good faith obligation requires compensation for
reliance made pursuant to a preliminary agreement for joint investment
or if a liability rule for reliance in precontractual negotiations is war-
ranted, the court is concerned with essentially the same problem of regu-
lating the holdup problem.
Schwartz and Scott endorse enforcement of preliminary agreements
with concomitant agreements to jointly investigate or explore only where
the joint promise to investigate is relatively explicit. 4' By contrast, this
Article advocates a legal default rule 42 that would grant compensation
where the promise to investigate jointly is only implicit. An implicit
agreement is found where one party would not have invested unless there
had been an understanding that the investing party would be compen-
sated if the other party operated opportunistically with respect to that
37. As Oliver Hart explains, "[w]e are all looking for a contract that will ensure that,
whatever happens, each side has some protection, both against opportunistic behaviour by
the other party and against bad luck." OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CorRAcrs AND FINANCIAL
STRUCTURE 2 (1996).
The cases that I identify to illustrate successful claims to prevent opportunistic conduct
do not necessarily involve cases in which the defendant has actually acted to hold up the
plaintiff following a sunk cost investment. In some instances the defendant exits the rela-
tionship without actually attempting to hold up the plaintiff. However, the potential for
opportunism is there in either case. If the defendant goes on to consummate the deal, he
can hold up the plaintiff through demands for part of the surplus. If the defendant exits
the relationship, the investment is wholly lost. It is the potential for opportunistic hold up
that the court must be concerned with because that prospect will act as a drag on gains
from trade in future transactions. I am grateful to Dick Craswell for raising this issue of
the presence of actual attempts at hold up. Email from Richard Craswell, Professor of
Law, Stanford University School of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law (Aug. 8, 2008, 16:07 CST).
38. Id.
39. See generally Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965) (grant-
ing recovery for reliance investments made during preliminary negotiations).
40. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 694. Thus, contrary to Schwartz and Scott,
who posit that "[liegal scholars and practicing lawyers have poorly understood these types
of cases" because they have considered them all together, this Article argues that it may be
useful to consider these cases together if the problems of holdup and sequential investment
are used to provide a unifying rationale. Id. at 663.
41. Id. at 690-91.
42. Richard Craswell provided valuable insight into the default rule approach of this
Article. See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promis-
ing, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 515 (1989) (explaining that "any default rule would also be
consistent with individual freedom, as long as the parties are allowed to change the
rule ... ").
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investment or had the ability to hold up the other party based on the
sequence of investment.
This Article will provide guidance for courts considering whether,
when, and why reliance investments made during precontractual negotia-
tions should be compensated through a default rule. 43 Where one party
solicits investments to reduce uncertainty or to hedge the future, and the
soliciting party is aware that the other party is relying by undertaking
such investment, the reliance should be compensated to prevent both the
holdup problem and the consequent under-reliance 44 that occurs when
one party solicits investments and then defers any action or contracting
until the investments are made by the first party.
45
Paying greater attention to how courts take account of the potential for
strategic behavior, holdup, and the problem of under-reliance in deciding
whether, when, and why to award reliance costs would provide greater
certainty to the area of precontractual reliance case law and give a more
complete picture of when courts will and should find liability. Precise
delineation of the stages of negotiation and agreement and the degree of
vulnerability to hold up by the other party may vary, depending on the
stage in which the investment is made and on whether the other party is
investing simultaneously or has the discretion to defer until later on.
These issues are important in resolving whether and when reliance costs
should be reimbursed.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II looks at the overall problem of
uncertainty in contracting and its effects on hindering complete contracts,
the effect on parties' incentives to invest in the precontractual period
given the holdup problem, and the methods for mitigating uncertainty,
including the solicitation of reliance investments that can facilitate oppor-
tunism. Part III examines the aleatory view of contracting, which denied
all recovery for reliance investments if no bargain contract were
achieved,46 and reexamines whether the traditional view makes sense in
situations of sequential investment. Part IV details the problem of
holdup that occurs when one party invests and is subject to the other
party appropriating part of the surplus in such a way that the investing
party cannot gain the full benefit of its investment and so engages in
suboptimal investment. 47 Part IV also examines cases in which sequential
43. Professor Omri Ben-Shahar would also provide guidance to courts, but he would
use a different approach: not a default rule, but a liability rule with the advantage that it
would obviate the need for line drawing. Omri Ben-Shahar, Contracts Without Consent,
152 U. PENN. L. Rev. 1829, 1834 (2004). Under his approach, "[w]hen parties reach an
agreement in principle over some fundamental terms but plan to further negotiate, each
party acquires the option to bind the other to a deal that includes the terms agreed upon,
supplemented by proposals made by the other party and terms most favorable to that
party." Id. This Article, instead, offers a way of determining liability based on a number
of factors, which will make liability determinations more predictable.
44. See Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 17, at 431-32.
45. See Johnston, supra note 15, at 495 (highlighting the awareness of the investment
as a factor in imposing liability).
46. Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 221.
47. Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 17, at 432.
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investment may be a cure to strategic behavior. It discusses instances in
which the sequential investment may require a legal response to curb a
moral hazard problem and encourage investment, at least whether there
are reasons to think that the parties would have agreed on such a liability
rule were it not for a variety of obstacles to its express adoption by the
parties, and where there are reasons to think that requiring parties to
expressly adopt a liability rule in each case would be more costly or less
effective than the alternative default rule of requiring parties to expressly
opt into a liability rule. Part V links the two separate contexts in which
reliance may occur: (1) following a preliminary agreement with an agree-
ment to invest simultaneously; and (2) during early preliminary precon-
tractual negotiations. 48 Part V suggests that the two contexts can be
linked since there is a risk of opportunism in each setting. It suggests that
the analytical framework embraced by Professors Alan Schwartz and
Robert Scott 4 9 should be extended to cover precontractual negotiation
where the risk of holdup is also great. Part VI reexamines recent reliance
case law to see if case outcomes are consistent with a rule imposing liabil-
ity when the risk of holdup is great. The support for such liability refutes
the thesis of Schwartz and Scott that the case law rejects recovery on
reliance unless an agreement is reached. 50 This Article finds courts will-
ing to find liability even when there is too much uncertainty for an agree-
ment to exist if the defendant has solicited sunk costs to hedge while
uncertainty is resolved.
The real question is whether on a comparative cost basis it is a priori
irrational to think that sometimes bargaining is relatively more wasteful
than law-supplied terms. 51 If so, then a law-supplied liability default rule
presumption makes sense in certain sets of cases.
II. UNCERTAINTY IN CONTRACTING
In complex economies, transactions are delayed and not instantaneous;
parties enter contracts but defer performance of one or both of them un-
til a future date. Uncertainty about many things, including the future,
then complicates the bargaining process.52 Uncertainties about the past,
including how one's counterparty has acted in prior transactions, may
also hinder efficient bargaining.5 3 Many types of uncertainty exist ex ante
that affect how parties bargain: the timing of offers, the relative
48. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 693-94.
49. Id. at 690-91.
50. Id. at 693.
51. Email from Peter M. Gerhart, Professor of Law, Case Western Law School, to
Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Law School (May 19, 2008, 14:46 CST)
(on file with author).
52. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 30-32.
53. See id. at 58. These uncertainties act as a form of a drag on trade. Parties struggle
to reduce and mitigate the negative effects of uncertainty in various ways, but the costs of
doing so constitute a type of transaction cost for parties. See Hermalin et al., supra note 6,
at 60.
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probability of a deal with a particular party,54 the incentive to dissemble
or to be honest to one's counterparty, 55 and the ability to reach a com-
plete contract. 5
6
These uncertainties affect the parties' incentive to invest in the pre-
contractual period given the holdup problem. The "ex ante holdup"
problem 57 is used to describe the negative effect on reliance investment
that occurs when a party who invests "expects to be 'held up,' namely, he
does not capture the full benefit of her [sic] reliance, but only a fraction
of it .... *58
The types of uncertainty and how parties respond to such uncertainties
in a variety of pre-contractual settings affect how the law should respond
using a model of justificational analysis 59 that intervenes only when doing
so would improve the parties' welfare. 60 In any transaction, parties ini-
tially do not even know whether there are gains to be made from a
trade.6 1 The seller of an asset does not know the opportunity cost of
selling its asset, and a buyer lacks knowledge of "what the opportunity
would be worth to it. ' ' 6 2 For example, a company considering a merger
faces substantial uncertainty of the first kind; it does not know ahead of
time if the merger of the two companies will be successful, and so the
bidder will not know what to pay for the target company ex ante.63 Par-
ties adopt different strategies to deal with the various types of uncertainty
in transactions. They use a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether to
proceed with negotiations, 64 how much money to spend in reliance on the
contract and at what point, how much pre-trade performance to engage
in, and how much to expend to acquire information to reduce uncertain-
ties that exist about the future state of nature65 and the opportunistic
proclivities of one's counterparty.
6 6
54. Johnston, supra note 15, at 389.
55. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 58.
56. Pierpaolo Battigali & Giovanni Maggi, Rigidity, Discretion, and the Costs of Writ-
ing Contracts, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 798, 798 (2002).
57. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 683 (explaining that "a party will not invest at
all when he must share the expected gain with his partner, and as a consequence the party's
portion of the return will be below his cost").
58. Bebchuck & Ben-Shahar, supra note 17, at 432. This is what Bebchuk and Ben-
Shahar refer to as the "Divergence Between Private and Social Gain." Id.
59. See infra note 210.
60. To determine what approach will promote optimal welfare for the parties, this Ar-
ticle focuses on the effect of the rule prospectively on parties who are planning future
transactions. In deciding whether judicial intervention would improve welfare, it will also
explore private strategies that parties use to deal with the uncertainty problem in pre-
contractual negotiations, to determine if the law can play any useful role in the pre-con-
tractual phase by facilitating investment that will help parties reach optimal contracts.
61. Email from Peter M. Gerhart, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University (Sept. 27, 2007,
10:28 CST) (on file with author).
62. Johnston supra note 15, at 388.
63. See id. at 387-88.
64. Id. at 389.
65. Hermalin, et al., supra note 6, at 59-60.
66. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 58.
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When we speak of uncertainty and the effects that it will have on par-
ties negotiating toward a final contract, we must also delineate the vari-
ous types of uncertainty that exist, since parties may respond to them in
different ways, and the nature of the uncertainty may hinder contracting
and investment in different ways and affect whether and when judicial
intervention might be needed.
There is uncertainty about the state of nature, events both past and
present. One cannot know what the future will bring no matter how
much one expends in resources. There is also uncertainty about behavior,
both past and present. 67 One does not know how one's counterparty has
acted in the past or how he is likely to act in the future.68 One lacks
information on that party's "propensity to diverge,' 69 or what Oliver Wil-
liamson calls the problem of opportunism. 70
If uncertainty did not exist, even in contracts that involve future per-
formance, the bargaining process would be simple, and parties could
achieve fully contingent contracts that are self-enforcing. 7 1 Parties could
draft complete contracts to take account of all relevant contingencies and
events that would affect the payoff and could price those contracts to
take account of different possible future events. 72 Even uncertainty
about the opportunistic tendencies of one's counterparty could be con-
trolled by detailed contracts that restricted the behavior of one's
counterparty and mapped out all the possible choices that would come
up.
7 3
Uncertainty in the context of a contract continuing into the future com-
plicates contracting and makes it hard for the parties to achieve a com-
pletely contingent contract7 4 that deals with the full range of uncertainty,
both about behavior and the future state of nature. 75 Uncertainty about
67. Id. at 58.
68. Id.
69. Email from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor Emeritus of Law, Case Western Reserve
University, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
(Jan. 27, 2005) (on file with author).
70. Parties who exchange goods simultaneously do not need to worry about what the
future will hold (what economists call the state of nature) or how to build in protections in
the contract to deal with future uncertain events, since the parties' obligations do not ex-
tend in the future. Even the uncertainty about whether one's counterparty is likely to act
opportunistically in the future will be of no concern if performance is rendered simultane-
ously. Uncertainty about how one's counterparty has acted in the past and how that might
affect the terms or willingness to transact if one has to depend on the future performance
of such person will be of no concern with instantaneous exchange, where one party does
not have to depend on the other. Because a party to an instantaneous transaction does not
have to depend on the other party for continuing performance obligations, any uncertainty
about the counterparty is irrelevant.
71. WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 30-31.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 48.
74. See e.g., Battigali & Maggi, supra note 56, at 798; Jean Tirole, Incomplete Con-
tracts: Where Do we Stand?, 67 ECONOMETRICA 741, 743 (1999).
75. Uncertainty about the choices that a party will have to make in the future makes it
difficult for a principal to control the potential opportunistic behavior of an agent, a classic
example of how uncertainty renders complete contracting difficult to achieve. See Frank
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a counterparty's past behavior may make it difficult to evaluate how risky
a partner one is dealing with. 76 This is the classic problem of adverse
selection. 77
Of course, if the investment could be deferred until the final contract,
then the contract could protect those investments because the bargain
and the price would more than cover reliance expenditures; it would in-
clude a profit as well.
If parties do not invest any sunk costs (reliance) in a project until the
uncertainty about events and returns is resolved, then the contract will
protect the parties. Any sunk costs that are made after a contract is en-
tered into meet the assurance that if the other party defaults or breaches,
the investing party will be protected by the expectation interest.78 If a
party invests in the interim period before uncertainty is resolved and
before a final contract is entered into, it may be taking the risk that the
precontractual reliance cost will not be compensated. 79
When a party invests transaction-specific sunk costs, the situation be-
comes even more complicated.8 0 If no sunk costs exist, it does not matter
if parties are unable to achieve a complete contract that addresses all
possible problems because of the cognitive limits and the cost of acquir-
ing information (bounded rationality), and uncertainty. Parties may sim-
ply exit the relationship without any adverse consequences.8 1 The
presence of sunk costs makes it costly to simply terminate.82 Moreover,
the failure to control for future contingencies or behavior through a com-
plete contract may reduce the amount of joint surplus that parties could
realize from the relationship.83
Parties may proceed on their own with search costs to mitigate uncer-
tainty to determine whether gains from trade exist.84 When we talk about
potential bargains, we are always talking about reciprocal uncertainty be-
cause each party is uncertain about the costs and benefits of a potential
bargain.8 5 But because there is a possible bargain, each party also has a
reason to reduce the other party's uncertainty, at least if that can be done
H. Esterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J. LAW & ECON. 425,
427 (1993).
76. WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 58. An insurance company may be uncertain about
an insured's past risky behavior and that may make it difficult to price the insurance in a
contract.
77. See id. at 47. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRIN-
CIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRt'C-TURE OF BUSINESS 37, 38 (John W. Pratt & Richard J.
Zeckhauser eds., 1985) (defining two types of principal-agent problems: moral hazard and
adverse selection).
78. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 664.
79. E.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.26 (4th ed. 2004).
80. The investment of such costs contributes to what Williamson calls the "fundamen-
tal transformation" in the relationship. WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 61.
81. Cf id. at 62 (stating that party with sunk costs (transaction-specific) is "effectively
committed to the transaction..
82. Id.
83. See Bebchuck & Ben-Shahar, supra note 17, at 423-24.
84. See Craswell, supra note 14, at 401.
85. See Johnston, supra note 15, at 388.
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with investments that are justified by the potential gains in trade from an
eventual bargain. A and B are each optimistic but uncertain, but because
of their optimism, each has an incentive to invest something in reducing
the other party's uncertainty in moving closer to a bargain. Each party
will move closer when the investment in reducing the other party's uncer-
tainty is offset by the actual or potential benefit of that reduction (which
could be in the form of future gains from trade).
Some of these search costs may be significant and parties' willingness
to undertake such costs "depends on whether they can be recouped" 86 in
an ultimate contract. Such an expense by a buyer of securities of a partic-
ular company might include purchasing a Dun & Bradstreet report or
perusing the company's financial statements.
In other cases, if some of the uncertainties cannot be resolved before a
commitment is given, the parties may also negotiate safeguards to protect
themselves in the event that a matter whose outcome is uncertain ex ante
is later resolved in a way that makes contractual performance disadvanta-
geous. 87 A common example is the inclusion of an express condition that
permits one party to exit the contract if a certain event that cannot be
known ex ante materializes. 88
Other uncertainties that cannot be resolved through search costs ex
ante, such as the value of a company post-merger, may prompt parties to
seek creative solutions to reach a contract ex ante that will postpone cer-
tain aspects of the deal, including pricing, until the uncertainty is re-
solved. 89 Parties might implement structural solutions to provide
incentives for the parties to work toward a successful outcome90 and
make the price contingent on a successful merger.91
One major tool that each party has for negotiating in the face of uncer-
tainty is to solicit information from the other party92 that will reveal qual-
86. Hermalin et al., supra note 6, at 59. This would not be true if the parties could
contract in advance on the amount to be invested and if the "party whose expected return
is positive [could] guarantee his partner a nonnegative return by agreeing to reimburse his
partner for investment costs if the project is not pursued." Schwartz & Scott, supra note
19, at 683 (detailing noncontractible investments interfering with contractual guarantees).
Contracting difficulties may make this impossible. Incentives to invest would also con-
tinue, even if no reimbursement promise could be made, if the party invests in general
market information that might show that one bargain would not produce gains from trade
but another bargain would. In that case, the investment in the information is not lost when
the first potential bargain is abandoned.
87. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 60.
88. FARNSWORTH, supra note 79, § 8.2 (detailing purpose "that conditionality presup-
poses some degree of risk arising out of uncertainty...").
89. Brian JM Quinn, Asset Specificity and Transaction Structures: A Case Study of
@ Home Corporation 2 Stan. L. & Econ., Olin, Working Paper No. 354 (2008), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1099382.
90. Janet Whitman, Company Finds Joint Ventures Ease Transitions, WALL ST. J., July
3, 2002, at B10.
91. That solution can serve to mitigate the moral hazard problem that would otherwise
exist.
92. For a discussion of the relevance of reliance investment in resolving uncertainty
problems, see Juliet P. Kostritsky, When Should Contract Law Supply a Liability Rule or
Term?: Framing a Principle of Unification for Contracts, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1283, 1306-13
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ities valuable in helping the putative offer or decide whether to make an
offer, and if so, on what terms.93 Sometimes the information is relatively
costless, both to give and receive.94 A party may signal its type by send-
ing out pessimistic statements if the chances of a deal are low and opti-
mistic statements if the chances of a deal are high.95 The advantage of
sending a low-cost, accurate signal is that it weeds out recipients with
whom the probability of a deal is low. The seller who sends a signal that
he is high-cost can get information from the recipients about buyers'
types merely by awaiting a response. Recipients will respond only to sell-
ers with whom there is a large probability of a trade occurring; low-value
buyers will not respond to high-cost sellers and vice versa.96 Because the
sender of the message wants to deal only with the subgroup with whom a
deal is probable or likely, the sender will send out accurate messages
about his type in order to ensure that the class who responds actually has
a high likelihood of proceeding towards a deal. The sender would not
want to send inaccurate messages because doing so would prompt too
many responses from recipients with incompatible qualities, thereby rais-
ing negotiating costs and lowering the probability of reaching a deal. 97
At other times, one or both parties do not have enough information
during preliminary negotiations to send cheap signals that take the form
of a statement that the probability of reaching a deal is high or low be-
cause the probability of reaching a deal with the other party depends on a
myriad of factors that are not yet known.98 Thus, cheap signals that are
(1) limited to information about one's own type; (2) designed to solicit
information from the other party about the other party's type; and (3)
costless to supply, may not really solve the bargaining problem posed
when parties remain uncertain about the probabilities of trade and about
the characteristics of the other party. To mitigate such uncertainty, a
party can solicit information in the form of reliance investment that is
transaction specific 99 and therefore potentially costly because it will be
(2000) (discussing neglect of the uncertainty problem in prior analyses of precontractual
liability issues). See also Johnston, supra note 15, at 494 (detailing structural conditions
under which pretrade performance might be the only way of reducing uncertainty about
"relatively indistinguishable seller types" to buyers).
93. Daniel Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law
and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CM!. L. REV. 903, 922 (1985) (discussing the impor-
tance of benefit to promisor as a reason for finding liability under promissory estoppel).
See also Juliet P. Kostritsky, An Assent Theory of Liability Emerging Under the Guise of
Promissory Estoppel: An Explanation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 895, 943 n.202
(1987) (documenting importance of benefit to defendant-promisor in finding of liability in
promissory estoppel cases).
94. Johnston, supra note 15, at 389. Examples of such low cost messages, "cheap talk"
include statements such as "everything looks great" or "we are not optimistic." Id.
95. Id. at 388-89.
96. Id. at 408-09.
97. Id. at 390, 409-10.
98. Id. at 389.
99. Oliver Williamson highlighted the importance of such transaction-specific invest-
ments posed for contracts, pointing out that where they existed, a "fundamental transfor-
mation" occurred that made it more important for parties to control contractual hazards
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worthless if no contract is formed. The cost means that the information
may be difficult to procure. The active role that such cooperative invest-
ment reliance can play in reducing uncertainty during the preliminary ne-
gotiation process has been overlooked in analyses of promissory estoppel
and a liability rule to govern negotiation. 100
The likelihood that a party will invest assets through reliance that will
be without value if no contract is formed can lead to a problem of oppor-
tunism, 10 1 where one party is exposed and vulnerable to holdup by the
other party (if that other party defers investing until later on). It is a
problem of moral hazard or risk that if one invests first, the other party
may decline to invest at all or to delay investing if it is privately more
beneficial to do so.10 2 This form of strategic behavior is made more prob-
lematic because of the uncertainty that exists with respect to the future
state of nature and, more importantly, the future behavior of one's
counterparty.10 3
If one party defers investment until after the other has invested and the
project succeeds, the parties will negotiate.104 However, the negotiation
price will ignore the sunk cost that has already been made; the party who
has already invested will not recover the reliance in the price since some
of the surplus will be shared. This is the holdup problem. 10 5 Parties
could delay a contract until the resolution of certain of these uncertain-
ties.10 6 This strategy might lead parties in the direction of delaying per-
formance until a future date, resulting in an instantaneous exchange
rather than a deferred-performance contract. Delaying performance
would eliminate the risk of contracting under uncertainty but would have
other negative effects, such as loss of benefits of investing early in the
contract when costs are low.' 0 7 Parties would also be subject to certain
risks that could be contained by a contract, such as the unavailability of a
product.
since transaction-specific investments make a costless exit impossible. See WILLIAMSON,
supra note 4, at 61-62.
100. The author noted the neglected connection between reliance and the reduction of
uncertainty in Kostritsky, supra note 93, at 1313-14.
101. See id. at 1315.
102. Presumably it will be beneficial to defer investment because when the surplus is
split between the parties, the entire portion otherwise available to the non-investing party
will be there whereas the investing party will gain whatever portion of the surplus would be
available but there will be no reimbursement for the prior investment by the one party.
103. Juliet P. Kostritsky, Taxonomy for Justifying Legal Intervention in an Imperfect
World: What to Do When Parties Have Not Achieved Bargains or Have Drafted Incomplete
Contracts, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 323, 340.
104. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 677-78.
105. See Bebchuck & Ben-Shahar, supra note 17, at 432.
106. Professor Avery Katz discusses delay as a possible response to certain types of
certainty that will be resolved over time. Katz, supra note 13, at 1268-69.
107. Katz discusses this concept of the benefits of early investment. See id. at 1267.
Professors Goetz and Scott originated the term "beneficial reliance" to describe the ways
in which promisees would adapt in advance of the promise being performed. See Charles
J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Con-
tract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1267-70 (1980).
1390 [Vol. 61
Uncertainty, Reliance, Preliminary Negotiations
However, it is far more likely that parties will begin relying on negotia-
tions even before a final agreement is ever reached, leading to a potential
holdup problem if they do not reach a private agreement to compensate
the investing party.
III. THE ALEATORY VIEW OF RELIANCE INVESTMENTS
Traditionally, under the aleatory view of contracts, which resulted from
the "knife-edge" 10 8 view of contract liability,10 9 any reliance undertaken
in the pre-contractual period was taken at one's own risk and was part of
an investment in a gamble that might or might not pay off in a consum-
mated transaction. 110 The law denied compensation to parties investing
in an asset (pre-contract) on the theory that investors "should take the
risk of wasted investments into account before making them."'1
The idea that each party invests and gambles on success seems reasona-
ble on one level, and has been justified on the efficiency ground that im-
posing liability during preliminary negotiation "might discourage parties
from entering negotiations."' 12 Moreover, where each side is bestowing
value on the other and, in effect, investing in the possibility of a deal,
these investments in precommitment action may be offsetting values in
which the implicit solution is that "I'm gaining as much as I'm giving."
113
Non-protection for large one-sided investments during preliminary
precontractual negotiation, however, may pose other contracting risks.
Although perhaps each party should have to take the risk that ordinary
preliminary search costs that benefit oneself should be non-compensa-
ble, 114 a default rule of non-reimbursement (without an express agree-
ment) may not be optimal, since a rule denying reimbursement would
discourage trade in some instances. Investments may pose a risk in con-
108. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 675.
109. Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 221. As Professor Farnsworth explained, under the
"common law's 'aleatory view' of negotiations: a party that enters negotiations in the hope
of the gain that will result from ultimate agreement bears the risk of whatever loss results if
the other party breaks off [the] negotiations." Id.
110. Id. at 221-22.
111. Hermalin et al., supra note 6, at 60.
112. Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 221.
113. Email from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
School of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
(May 7. 2008, 15:04 CST). An example of a case where each party invests sunk costs post-
contract is discussed in Brian JM Quinn's recent article. Quinn, supra note 89, at 2. In that
case, since the success of the venture depended on both parties investing and there was the
risk that either party would defect from the investments needed to create a successful na-
tional cable company, @Home used multiple strategies to promote cooperation. One was
the economic lock-in, which initially made switching costly. As long as the cost of switch-
ing was high, the partners would refrain from defecting, allowing @Home to recoup the
investment in cable infrastructure by partnering with Comcast in such a way that @Home
would acquire subscribers who would take the broadband service. The presence of such
reciprocal transaction-specific investments, with the economic-lock-in effect, helped to mit-
igate opportunistic defection. Id.
114. This would especially be true if the investments were not transaction-specific. See
WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 61-62. An exception would apply if the parties reached an
agreement expressly providing compensation.
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tracting-particularly if (1) they are transaction specific; (2) they are
made before the other party has invested, formed a contract, or entered
into a preliminary agreement; (3) they are invested primarily to benefit
the other party;1 15 and (4) if the success and risks of the investment relate
largely to factors over which the promisor has control or which relate to
the promisor's business needs or its business capacities and not those of
the promisee-since a promisee may find it difficult to assess the
probability of a deal being successful. If unaddressed, this risk will act as
a drag on gains from trade. 116
Differences in the nature of risks that parties would be willing to as-
sume as part of the cost of doing business may exist. Parties might be
willing to consider some types of investment, as one judge described it,
"part of the overhead expenses of his business which he hopes will be met
out of the profits of such contracts as are made," especially when each
party invests simultaneously. 117 If, however, a party makes investments
known as "cooperative investments,"' 1 8 which benefit the noninvesting
party, without simultaneously lowering costs for the investing party
should the deal go through, it may be harder to provide appropriate in-
centives for such investments when contracts are incomplete ex ante.11 9
The aleatory view may be founded on an erroneous assumption that
each party would invest simultaneously, and neither party would be sub-
ject to the particular problem of holdup that occurs with sequential in-
vestment. 20 It may assume that each party would invest a certain amount
of parallel search and lawyer costs to ascertain whether a deal is profita-
ble. If so, the aleatory view denying recovery for precontractual reliance
may have survived on assumptions that ignore the potential problem that
arises with sequential investment.121 Sequential investment can occur (1)
115. See Che & Hausch, supra note 34, at 126 (discussing cooperative-type
investments).
116. Vernon Smith, Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics, 93 AM.
ECON. REV. 465, 466 (2003).
117. Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 221 (quoting William Lacey (Hounslow) Ltd. v. Davis
[1957] 1 W.L.R. 932 (Q.B.))
118. See Che & Hausch, supra note 34, at 126.
119. See Yeon-Koo Che & Tai-Yeong Chung, Contract Damages and Cooperative In-
vestments, 30 RAND J. OF ECON. 84, 103 (1999). This Article assumes that the parties can-
not contract ex ante on the ideal investment because of difficulties in specifying
investment-related information." Che & Hausch, supra note 34, at 125. Therefore, a con-
tract cannot curb the opportunism that necessarily accompanies transaction-specific invest-
ments. If such investments could be contracted on, then parties would invest optimally but
without such contracts a party will invest suboptimally. Id. Even in the absence of a con-
tract that would guarantee optimal investment, parties could enter into an incomplete con-
tract and renegotiate subsequently "to the quantity that is ex post efficient." Id. at 126.
Even if such renegotiation might result in suboptimal investment because an investing
party might not receive all of the surplus due to inequalities in bargaining power, there are
independent reasons and incentives to invest. Those reasons might mean that even with
incomplete contracts and the possibility of renegotiation ex post, "an appropriately chosen
initial contract can provide the right incentives for investments." Id. However, these opti-
mal results could only be achieved if selfish, non-cooperative investments, are made. Id.
120. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 676-78.
121. William P. Rogerson, Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem, 59 REV.
ECON. STUD. 777, 777 (1992). The aleatory view was accepted without critical analysis of
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in precontractual negotiation when one party (the putative offeror) de-
lays investment to collect information on putative offerees, and (2) fol-
lowing explicit agreements in which one party delays investment to
increase its private advantage.
This Article suggests that courts analyzing the normative question of
whether reliance should be compensated should pay particular attention
to whether the danger of holdup with sequential investment is present,
regardless of whether it occurs because one party has acted strategically
for private gain in delaying a simultaneously agreed-to investment, or be-
cause there is an incentive by putative offerors to delay investment to
resolve one or more uncertainties. It is no longer possible to rationalize
the denial of all compensation for reliance under one universal theory of
gambling on risk in which each party could and should judge what each is
willing to invest in a gamble when there is no guaranteed success in out-
come. While one should make certain types of investments at one's own
risk, particularly when the other party is making simultaneous invest-
ments and thus maximizing the chances that a deal will materialize, the
willingness to invest and the nature of the risks involved may change ei-
ther when the investment is a cooperative investment that is likely to be
of most benefit to the other party or when the investment subjects the
investing party to the risk of holdup. For that reason, the aleatory view of
contract that denies all compensation for precontractual reliance should
be reexamined.
IV. THE HOLDUP PROBLEM
To fully understand the problem of sequential investment in precon-
tractual negotiation, the holdup problem, and the law's possible re-
sponses, one must examine (1) how and when parties rely when contracts
are incomplete and (2) the risks that are posed by such reliance
investment.
The investment of a transaction-specific sunk cost can render one vul-
nerable to the problem of hold up. Holdup may occur at several stages of
the bargaining process. If a party invests sunk costs during precontrac-
tual negotiation without a binding commitment from the other party, the
other party may exploit that investment by holding out for a higher
price-a larger share of the surplus. The investing party risks losing all of
the investment if no deal is consummated and so is vulnerable to this kind
of pressure.1 22 Hobbes himself identified this vulnerability as fundamen-
its underlying assumptions, so it is hard to know whether the aleatory theory of reliance
investment continues to make sense once the holdup problem is accounted for. See John-
ston, supra note 15, at 388.
122. Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481,
492 (1996). Holdup can of course occur at a later point in time after contracts have been
entered into. As parties begin to invest in what Williamson calls "special purpose technol-
ogy," the parties' ability to deal with strategic behavior by simply terminating becomes
impossible. WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 32. It is for that reason that Williamson thinks
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tal to explaining the need for enforcement in contract. 123 Because these
investments may be unverifiable 124 or uncertain ahead of time, ex ante
contracting on such reliance investments may be impossible.125 Con-
tracting ex ante may be particularly difficult when one party is afforded
discretion to "gear up" or "work hard," and it is clear that the party urg-
ing such investment broadly wants investments that will place the
noninvesting party in the position of being ready to proceed should a
contract materialize, but the exact nature of such desired investments is
fuzzy, in part because it is the non-investing party who is most familiar
with the business that will utilize the investments. 126
One way to provide incentives to make efficient investments when ex
ante contracting is difficult is through an ex ante agreement to divide the
surplus in such a way that those parties who invest more receive a greater
share of the surplus. 127 Yet where the projects undertaken have an un-
verifiable surplus, such efforts to reward and protect reliance investments
will not work. 128
Without such ex ante contractual protection, the investing party has to
depend on ex post arrangements.' 29 However, the postponement makes
the investing party vulnerable to his expenses not being recouped in the
surplus.130 This vulnerability disincentivizes investment in future transac-
tions and discourages trade from occurring in the first place. A party may
be reluctant to undertake significant costs without some safeguard.' 31 In
a recurring pattern in the case law, party B is uncertain of party A's abil-
ity to perform, and party A makes investments to reduce that uncertainty.
Under some circumstances-particularly where the investment by A has
that "[g]overnance structures that attenuate opportunism and otherwise infuse confidence
are evidently needed." Id. at 63.
123. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, OR, THE MATT-ER, FORM, AND POWER OF A COM-
MONWEALTH, ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL 69 (2d ed., London, George Routledge & Sons
1886) (1651).
124. Sergei Guriev & Dmitriy Kvasov, Contracting on Time, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1369,
1369 (2005).
125. See Battigali & Maggi, supra note 56, at 801.
126. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 677-78.
127. Id. at 678.
128. Id.; see also Che & Hausch, supra note 34, at 125 n.1 (detailing difficulties in con-
trolling opportunism in contracts when "specific investments often take a nonmonetary,
intangible form such as human capital investment").
129. Id. at 677-78.
130. Id.
131. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 32-33 (suggesting that parties will seek safe-
guards against hazards in order to increase the overall gain from trade). Transactions with-
out safeguards pose a higher risk and will be priced accordingly. Id. at 33. To solve this
problem, Jason Johnston has proposed a rule making the non-investing party liable for
pretrade performance (a form of reliance) in order to encourage those who are pessimistic
about a trade occurring to speak up. Johnston, supra note 15, at 397. This Article suggests
that the problem is one of uncertainty that makes the noninvesting party uncertain about
whether a trade will occur until the investment is made rather than concealment of the true
probabilities. Thus, this Article suggests adopting a default rule for solicited investments
that are useful in mitigating uncertainty for one party. That rule should apply as a default
rule because the soliciting party is often uncertain about whether a trade will occur but
needs and is benefited by an investment.
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no value outside the potential bargain with B' 32-the parties would ei-
ther expressly or impliedly agree to protect A in making that investment.
If obstacles exist to contractually protecting such transaction-specific in-
vestments, and if it is an investment that would not otherwise occur, or
where the incentive to invest would be suboptimal or the incentive to
enter future transactions would be jeopardized, the law would have an
interest in protecting the value of that investment by recognizing and en-
forcing that express or implied agreement to reimburse such
investments. 133
Prior scholarly analyses of reliance investments have evaluated reliance
from the perspective of providing optimal incentives for parties to engage
in efficient reliance, given the probabilities of a trade occurring.' 34 The
law encourages efficient behavior by reimbursing parties only when they
engage in efficient reliance, but not otherwise. That approach prevents
parties from wasting assets towards the realization of transactions when
the likelihood of success is too low. 135 These analyses evaluate a reliance
decision as a cost-benefit analysis that occurs at a moment in time.' 36
In deciding whether to invest reliance costs, a party looks at how an
investment will benefit the investing party. Using a Learned Hand ap-
proach to reliance investment, 137 scholars have urged that efficient reli-
ance occurs when the investment is worth the cost. The cost is measured
by the investment that will be lost if the deal does not materialize, and the
benefit is measured by the benefits that will accrue if the deal goes
through. The investing party weighs the probability of the trade material-
izing in order to determine whether an investment is justified. 13 8 Craswell
argues that judicial decisions often reach results consistent with the pro-
tection of efficient reliance. 139
132. As Avery Katz makes clear,
the only reliance investments needing protection are those that are specific to
the transaction or relationship. If the offeree's investment is fully salvage-
able through resale or a substitute contract, then there is no holdup problem.
Because the offeree can then make the offeror compete against all other pos-
sible market uses for the investment, he will have all the bargaining power
and [the offeror] will have none.
Katz, supra note 13, at 1276 n.76.
133. The problem of the presence of idiosyncratic sunk costs deterring professionals
from entering service contracts, such as construction, because of the danger of ex post
holdup, has been studied. See Tom K. Lee & Ivan P.L. Png, The Role of Installment Pay-
ments in Contracts for Services, 21 RAND J. OF ECON. 83, 83-84 (1990). Lee and Png sug-
gest that installment payments can incentivize greater initial efforts, as would a law-
supplied rule implying an installment payment scheme to provide incentives to enter con-
tracts where the danger of holdup would otherwise deter such contracts. Id. at 95.
134. See e.g., Craswell, supra note 122, at 484, 491-92.
135. Id. at 493.
136. See also Katz, supra note 13, at 1269.
137. Sometimes the parties themselves will engage in efficient reliance calculations
without the law having to intervene. At other times, the parties may have insufficient
incentives to invest, particularly when the prospect of a holdup problem looms large. See
Craswell, supra note 122, at 491.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 507.
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Under this cost-benefit approach, a promisee will not want to invest
too early when the probability of a trade occurring is low 140 but will not
want to delay investment too long since some of the benefits of investing
in the deal early would be lost.
A significant drawback to the cost-benefit approach as a method for
determining whether the law should impose liability for reliance costs on
the other party-a normative question-is that it ignores the essential
structural problem of sequential investment that may result in a distor-
tion of reliance incentives through the holdup problem.141
The notion that a party will invest efficiently given the probabilities of
a future trade occurring is only true if one ignores that, if there is no
enforceable commitment from the other party, an investing party is in a
vulnerable position once the investment is made. Once a promisee has
invested first before a contract is formed, he becomes subject to holdup
by the other party and will have a reduced incentive to invest. 142 Antici-
pating this possibility, a promisee may forego a trade even if there are
gains from the trade. Even if a bargain is struck later, the investing party
will not be able to capture all of the gain in the bargain.143 Whoever
invests first is subject to this loss, and under such circumstances "invest-
ment will be inefficient.' 44 This is because the party "would invest only
until the marginal cost equaled [the] fraction of the expected gain."' 145
A different but equally problematic version of the holdup problem can
also occur if "the distribution of ex ante costs across the parties is suffi-
ciently 'mis-matched' with the distribution of Sui'plus."'1 4 6 In that case, an
investing party may be disinclined to invest because the amount that it
140. Id. at 493. See also Katz, supra note 13, at 1268.
141. Craswell, supra note 122, at 493 (discussing the "distortion" in incentives
problem).
142. This would not be true if the parties could contract in advance on the amount to be
invested and if the "party whose expected return is positive [could] guarantee his partner a
nonnegative return by agreeing to reimburse his partner for investment costs if the project
is not pursued." Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 683. Contracting difficulties, however,
may make this impossible, particularly where the party investing is given broad discretion
to perform by gearing up or working hard. Such discretionary actions make contracting
costly, if not impossible. Id. at 682-83.
143. As Professor Craswell explains: "[The] ability [of the noninvestor] to hold out for
a share of B's profits is what distorts B's reliance incentives in the absence of a binding
commitment. B must still bear all the downside risks of his reliance, for if it becomes
inefficient for S to perform, then she will walk away from the deal without paying anything.
But if B's reliance becomes worthwhile-that is, if it becomes efficient for S to perform-
then B will not capture all of the gains from his reliance because S may extract some of
those gains by holding out for a higher price." Craswell, supra note 122, at 492.
144. Vladimir Smirnov & Andrew Wait, Hold-Up and Sequential Specific Investments,
35 RAND J. ECON. 386, 386 (2004).
145. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 679. One possible solution that would result in
the party investing efficiently would be to allow that party an option of making it a "take-
it-or-leave-it-offer" to the non-investing party. That prospect would permit the investing
party the option of recovering all of the surplus and would encourage efficient reliance.
However, these solutions are dependent on an assumption of no renegotiation, which can-
not be guaranteed, so these solutions will not solve the underinvestment problem. Id.
146. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the
Coase Theorem, 116 ECON. J. 223, 229 (2006).
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receives in surplus will not cover the investment.1 47 As Craswell deftly
explains:
[A]ny reliance by B must make consummation of the deal more im-
portant to him, since reliance increases the difference between the
benefit B receives if S performs, and the loss B suffers if S fails to
perform. But once consummation of the deal becomes more impor-
tant to B, S can exploit this by threatening not to perform unless B
agrees to pay her a higher price. 148
This structural hazard of holdup can be looked at as a specific example
of the general problem of opportunism. The investing party does not
know ahead of time whether the party soliciting the sunk cost will strate-
gically use the investment by denying the investing party the full benefit,
either in the negotiated bargain or in a side payment of reimbursement.
The promisee is subject to the risk that if a bargain is ever reached
between them, it "will compensate [only] the promisor for the investment
[costs] .... "1 49 The disincentive to invest ex ante could be exacerbated if
the part of the surplus available to the investing party did not even cover
the ex ante investment costs. The promisee, because of a poor bargaining
position that exists when he has sunk costs and the promisor does not,
could theoretically, following the sinking of such costs, tell the promisor
that he will not proceed, but such a "threat to exit unless his investment
costs are reimbursed is not credible."' 50
In any project, the parties choose when to begin investing. Each party
can invest at the same time, or one party can defer investment until after
the first party has invested. Each of these investment regimes may be
efficient or inefficient in different circumstances, and each legal regime
governing such factual scenarios may address or exacerbate the problems
of holdup, or incentives to invest, or create a new problem of follow-up
opportunism. 15 1
Sometimes sequential investment may be necessary as an antidote to a
certain type of holdup problem. If a financer lends funds to a new and
untested entrepreneur (a species of the uncertainty problem) at the same
time that the entrepreneur makes contractual promises to repay, the fi-
nancer may decline to lend, as lending will yield a negative return.152 The
147. Id. at 230. Anderlini and Felli explain that "the parties will pay the costs only if
the distribution of the surplus generated by the negotiation will allow them to recoup the
cost ex post." Id. That may not occur if there is a mis-match between investment and
distribution of the surplus. Id. at 229. The authors point to a famous incident involving a
decision by a small research company (that had an operating system for PCs that IBM was
interested in acquiring rights to) to refuse to make the necessary preliminary investments
because of a fear of a holdup by IBM. Id. at 227. That decision was an inefficient outcome
caused by the fear of holdup. Id.
148. Craswell, supra note 122, at 492.
149. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 666.
150. Id. at 666 n.12.
151. Smirnov & Wait, supra note 144, at 388.
152. Id. at 392 (discussing D.V. Neher, Staged Financing: An Agency Perspective, 66
REv. ECON. STUD. 255 (1999)).
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financer will be subject to a risk of holdup or moral hazard by the entre-
preneur, who can appropriate the loaned funds without building a com-
pany or any assets. This is a form of opportunistic behavior by a
borrower.
In such cases, sequential or staged investment by the financer or staged
financing could provide a needed antidote or safeguard to the financer,
without which the financer would not lend. If the financer loaned all of
the money up front to start up a project, for example, the financer would
be subject to the moral hazard of the entrepreneur expropriating the cash
without using it to make the venture profitable or engaging in a holdup
and asking for a renegotiation of more favorable terms. Since the fi-
nancer has little leverage at the point where the project is yet unbuilt, the
financer might make concessions in order to recover some of the money.
This is the problem posed by a kind of investment in which one party
invests everything up front, leading to a moral hazard/holdup problem.
To alleviate the problem, the financer could tie lending to the entrepre-
neur to the stages when assets are built up in the new company, thereby
rendering the financer less subject to holdup. 153 Once the assets are es-
tablished, the financer will have the ability to realize monies to cover any
default by the borrower.' 54 In such a case, deferred investment is there-
fore a private strategy to curb holdup by the entrepreneur.
In other cases, however, rather than being a response to a hold up
problem, sequential investment may be a form of strategic or opportunis-
tic behavior that may need to be controlled through a law-supplied de-
fault rule.' 55
The promisee sinking costs that leave him vulnerable to hold up will act
as a disincentive to reliance investment if there is no reimbursement for
such reliance costs. 156 For that reason, this Article suggests that because
the same danger of moral hazard exists whenever a promisor faces uncer-
tainty about the nature of the ultimate transaction and deliberately delays
any investment until the promisee has invested during precontractual ne-
gotiations, or when a party agrees to invest simultaneously and then de-
lays to gain a private advantage following a preliminary agreement, the
law should consider in each case what rules to craft to reduce the costs of
a hold up. That may involve formulating a liability default rule that com-
pensates the investing party.
In the next section, the Article will trace how the threat of hold up
permeates both precontractual negotiation (the Hoffman type case) and
preliminary agreements that involve an express agreed to sequence of si-
multaneous investment. It argues that the two phases both involve a uni-
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. For a discussion of opportunism and its costs if uncontrolled, see WILLIAMSON,
supra note 4, at 63 (including the risk that "gains [can] be dissipated by costly subgoal
pursuit").
156. Bebchuck & Ben-Shahar, supra note 17, at 425. Contrary to what one might ex-
pect, the problem of underinvestment can occur even if both parties invest. Id. at 432.
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fied threat and should therefore be considered part of one problem
demanding judicial attention.
V. PRELIMINARY AGREEMENTS AND PRECONTRACTUAL
NEGOTIATION: TWO CONTEXTS BUT
ONE RISK OF HOLD UP
Schwartz and Scott have provided particular guidance to solve one type
of hold up problem-that of one party acting opportunistically following
preliminary agreement on some terms and an agreement by both parties
to invest simultaneously, following which one party chooses to delay its
investment. 157 The delay gives one party the advantages associated with
sequential investment and constitutes a form of holdup.158 As the authors
point out, one party may have "an incentive to defect from any such
agreement"' 59 because "by delaying her decision whether to invest until
after the promisee has invested... [t]he promisor benefits from defection
if the project turns out to be unprofitable because she will not have sunk
costs in a losing deal."' 6°
These preliminary agreements often take the form of letters of intent
or other agreements in which parties agree to some, but not all, terms and
postpone negotiation of those open terms until a later date.' 61 Depend-
ing on the parties' intentions, these preliminary agreements may be either
(1) fully enforceable; 162 (2) not binding at all if the parties have indicated
their intent that no enforceable contract would exist absent a further for-
mal agreement; 63 or (3) binding only in the sense of committing the par-
ties to bargain in good faith towards a profitable outcome. 164
157. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 666-67.
158. Id. at 682.
159. Id. at 666.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 664. See also Johnston, supra note 15, at 450. This postponement of some
terms with an agreement reached in stages is particularly likely to occur in "corporate
mergers or acquisitions, commercial lending, executive employment, and the sale of highly
customized goods." Id. at 449-50.
162. Preliminary agreements will be interpreted as fully enforceable if the parties in-
tend the final written contract to act merely as a memorial of a fully negotiated agreement.
Id. at 467. See also United States v. P.J. Carlin Constr. Co., 224 F. 859, 862-23 (2d Cir.
1915).
163. See e.g., R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 71 75 (2d Cir.
t984); see also Feldman v. Alleghency Int'l, 850 F.2d 1217, 1222 (7th Cir. 1988) (cited in
PET Robertson, Inc. v. Volvo trucks N.A., Inc., 420 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2005), wherein Judge
Easterbrook explained Feldman as holding that "Illinois is averse to enforcing tentative
agreements that are expressly contingent on the signing of formal or final documents")
164. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 664. See also Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n v.
Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (providing a framework for determin-
ing which preliminary agreements would be considered binding commitments that required
parties to bargain in good faith toward a final contract). Courts developed a multi-factor
test to determine the parties' intent in these preliminary agreements. Johnston, supra note
15, at 468. However, such tests have resulted in "doctrinal ambiguity." Id. at 467. Profes-
sor Johnston finds fault with the current tests for judging whether preliminary agreements
should be binding due to the uncertainty posed by applying tests that depend on "ex post
investigation of negotiating history." Id. at 474-75.
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After such agreements, one or both parties may rely, and when such
agreements exist, both parties are obligated to abide by an obligation of
good faith to reach an ultimate agreement. 165 If one party invests and the
other party breaches its obligation to act in good faith (triggered by the
binding preliminary agreement), then those reliance costs may be com-
pensable. 166 These interim agreements protect reliance investments if a
court decides that a preliminary agreement is binding in the third sense
above, and one party has breached by refusing to bargain in good faith.
167
The threat of such a liability rule encourages parties to live up to their
obligations of good faith and permits both parties to invest and rely effi-
ciently. 168 The law-supplied obligation of good faith discourages the
problem of holdup that might otherwise exist. 169
Schwartz and Scott have reinvigorated the study of these preliminary
agreements contexts by identifying the problem of holdup.170 Such
holdup demanded new scrutiny. In their recent article, they note that
165. Teachers Ins., 670 F. Supp. at 498; see also Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Con-
tract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 673, 681 (1960).
166. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 664-65. Schwartz and Scott argue that the
emerging new legal rule requires a party to compensate the other party for reliance costs
when there has been a breach of an agreement to invest simultaneously. Id. at 667, 675.
However, Schwartz and Scott, while applauding the tendency of courts to reach outcomes
awarding reliance investment to the investing party against the party who has delayed in-
vestment, find the legal approach that ties the liability to the obligation of good faith to be
"deficient" and "unnecessary," in part because of the lack of clarity about the scope and
content of the good faith obligation. Id. at 667. Schwartz and Scott would award reliance
costs whenever there has been a breach of the agreed-on investment sequence. Id. This
Article argues that the reason for imposing an obligation of good faith, and with it a liabil-
ity rule to govern breaches of bad faith, is linked to the obligation to prevent opportunism
and holdup. The problem with jettisoning good faith and grounding the liability rule in the
breach of an agreed on investment sequence is that it is not a broad enough basis to permit
courts to impose liability in the precontractual phase where there is no agreed upon invest-
ment sequence and no preliminary agreement. Rather than limit the obligation to com-
pensate for reliance investments to an ex ante agreement to invest simultaneously, the law
should look at when intervention is justified to prevent holdup problems that occur at
different phases of negotiation and contracting. It can occur in cases where the parties
have breached an agreement to invest simultaneously, but it can also apply in other set-
tings not involving an express agreement to invest simultaneously. Thus, the question be-
comes how and when can a liability rule obligating one party to reimburse the other party
for reliance costs be justified? An obligation of good faith is simply a broad legal rubric
that provides a foundation for protecting reliance costs when doing so is necessary to pre-
vent opportunistic behavior. This might be the situation in a case involving no preliminary
agreement at all, as in Wood v. Lucy, 118 N.E. 214, 214-15 (N.Y. 1917) (finding implied
obligation to use reasonable best efforts to deter opportunistic behavior that would other-
wise occur if marketer could enter into exclusive contract but then fail to use any efforts
thereby depriving designer of any profits at all), or in the context of precontractual negoti-
ations that do not result in any preliminary agreement or any agreed-on investment
sequence.
167. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 667.
168. Id. at 696 (hypothesizing good incentive effect from liability rule in terms of en-
couraging duty to invest simultaneously following preliminary agreement).
169. Schwartz and Scott would streamline the process and dispense with the need to
determine whether the obligation of good faith was breached by making liability turn
solely on whether verifiable reliance investments were made by one party after one party
breached a promise to invest simultaneously and then delayed doing so. Id. at 686-87.
170. Id. at 682, 685.
[Vol. 611400
Uncertainty, Reliance, Preliminary Negotiations
holdup occurs when one party invests and the other party, who had prom-
ised to invest simultaneously, delays its investment. 17 1 That delay would
subject the investing party to ex post holdup because the investing party
may suffer when the other party declines to invest simultaneously. 172
Such delay by one party can subject the investing party to the prospect of
a negative return on the transaction.173 Because there is some unknown
probability of such hold up occurring, 174 parties will simply decline to
invest or transact 175 as a means of self-protection. This results in lost
gains from trade. 176
Schwartz and Scott argue that reliance investments should be compen-
sated when they arise in the course of such preliminary agreements if one
party has promised to invest simultaneously (and the investment is
needed for a successful project) but has deferred investment for strategic
reasons. 177 The authors provide case law evidence that courts reach re-
sults to protect reliance investment in such fact patterns. 178
The identification of hold up by Schwartz and Scott as a reason for
protecting reliance expenditures advances the understanding of one prob-
lem that arises when parties rely after reaching preliminary agreements
and agreements to invest simultaneously, and one party subsequently
"defects" from this plan. 17 9 Prior judicial determinations of the compen-
sability of reliance investments following preliminary agreements turned
on ascertaining the parties' intent, but that approach failed to provide
adequate guidance to courts. 18 0 Although many courts have apparently
reached results consistent with Schwartz and Scott's thesis,' 8 ' they have
done so without specific guidance on the normative importance of a
deviation from an agreed on investment plan and the danger of an ex post
holdup.
171. Id. at 686.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 685.
174. Id. at 686 n.64 (detailing particular circumstances in which "the prospect of []
breach can be sufficiently great to deter the buyer from participating"). Then parties
would make Bayesian estimates about the likelihood of a departure from the agreed on
investment sequence.
175. Id. at 686.
176. When the parties have actually reached an agreement, albeit one that is incom-
plete on the surplus division, there may be a different kind of hold up that occurs as a
result of renegotiation. If one party invests, and the parties cannot commit not to renegoti-
ate, then after investment, a party who invested "seldom could bargain to capture the en-
tire gain." Id. at 679. That would lessen the incentive to invest as the non-investing party
would through renegotiation be able to capture some of the surplus.
177. Id. at 685-86. The example given by Schwartz & Scott involves a doctor who in-
vests in a practice by moving and joining a practice with the expectation that the practice
would invest by training the doctor. Id. at 695. If the practice declined to invest in training
after promising to do so, then the doctor would be subject to hold up. Id.
178. For a list of cases, see id. at 694-702.
179. This would facilitate efficient investment because there are instances where "the
buyer's expected return ... is negative without the reliance offset and positive with it, [so]
a buyer who expects to recover reliance will make a preliminary agreement that he other-
wise would have rejected." Id. at 686.
180. Id. at 675.
181. For a list of cases, see id. at 694-702.
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Schwartz and Scott's analysis of many factual scenarios in which parties
reach a preliminary agreement and an agreement to invest simultane-
ously and then one delays while the other relies, identifies a key factor
that correlates with a plaintiff's likely success on a reliance claim. That
factor could logically be applied to other cases of reliance not involving
agreements to invest simultaneously. If so applied, it suggests a broad
justificative framework. That framework suggests that where one party's
reliance leaves it vulnerable to hold up, a liability rule might be required
to prevent problems of under-reliance and to encourage transacting that
might otherwise not occur. 182 Schwartz and Scott, however, conclude
that to determine whether a reliance claim should be compensable, courts
should ascertain if the parties reached a preliminary agreement that in-
cluded a planned sequence of investment. 183 Where both parties agree to
invest simultaneously, and one party strategically delays investment for
private benefit, the party who delays should be liable to the other party
for verifiable reliance costs. 184 Liability would be optimal since the as-
sumption is that the greatest gains from trade would have been realized
from simultaneous investment. When one party defers investment for
private gain (the same problem that a principal faces with a shirking
agent' 85), that behavior acts as a drag on gains from trade that should be
controlled.
Although Schwartz and Scott's suggested liability rule is a narrow one
and involves (1) reliance investments, (2) undertaken after a preliminary
agreement is reached, and (3) after an express agreement is reached that
obligates both parties to undertake simultaneous investment, this Article
contends that their analytical framework can and should be extended to
the precontractual negotiation context, an area that many scholars, in-
cluding Schwartz and Scott, contend demonstrates "scant support in the
law of contracts" for liability. 186 What prompts Schwartz and Scott to
182. See Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 17, at 431-32.
183. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 704.
184. Id. at 686-87 (pointing to the fact that a "portion of the buyer's investment cost...
is verifiable ex post," even if not ex ante contractible).
185. See, e.g., Wood v. Lucy, 118 N.E. 214, 214-15 (N.Y. 1917).
186. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 669. When Schwartz and Scott argued that
Hoffman is "wrong as a matter of doctrine," id. at 670, they did so partly on the basis that
the Restatement itself contains only a single definition of "promise" and there is no sepa-
rate section between promises that induce unbargained for reliance and promises that are
"the product of a bargained-for exchange." Id. at 669-70. The fact that the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts makes no distinction within Section 2 itself can best be understood
by the fact that a separate section exists on the definition of an offer in Section 24. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 2, 24 (1981). When a promise reaches the point
where it constitutes an offer, that is the point at which one can conclude that there is a
bargained for exchange; the offeror has named the price that would make him better off if
the offeree were to accept. Thus, one could certainly argue that the drafters of the Restate-
ment knew how to make a distinction, and when the drafters defined "promise" in Section
2, they deliberately did not use the word offer. In not doing so and using the word prom-
ise, they were distinguishing it from cases in which the putative offeror had reached the
point that he names the price on which he is willing to be bound, as in a bargained for
exchange in Sections 24 and 71. Had they intended the word "promise" in Section 90 to
have the more fully developed meaning of an offer, they could have done so, as they did in
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determine that the delay in a planned simultaneous investment should
lead to liability is that one party has acted strategically to delay because
that delay would be privately beneficial, though not mutually, benefi-
cial187 and would have the negative effect of discouraging buyers from
pursuing efficient projects. The decision to impose liability for breaches
of agreed-on investment plans cannot be answered reflexively without in-
voking a normative framework. That framework is built on certain as-
sumptions about how parties are likely to behave in the absence of any
rule and what effect it will have on the parties' goal of maximizing wel-
fare. In certain cases one party will benefit from delay, especially when
the likelihood of success is high and the investment cost is significant.18 8
Waiting will allow the party to recover investments through the ex post
bargain. Investments made beforehand would not be recoverable because
they would already have been sunk at the time of the bargain.
Under a consequentialist framework, investors would anticipate that
non-investors would act opportunistically and would not believe promises
by non-investors to refrain from such behavior.' 8 9 Consequently, inves-
tors would forego opportunities as the only means of protecting them-
selves against the possible negative returns that occur when sellers defer
investment. 190
The problems with deferring investment are twofold. First, even if si-
multaneous investment would be ideal, one party may depart from the
ideal to increase private gain, causing a reduction in gains from trade.
Second, the anticipation of this strategic behavior may cause some parties
to refuse to participate at all because they fear the breach of their
counterparty's promise to invest simultaneously. Efficient deals there-
fore will not take place. 191 A liability rule for broken promises to invest
simultaneously encourages parties to invest optimally and could solve the
hold up problem.
This Article suggests that a liability rule for reliance expenses should be
adopted more broadly to apply whenever there is a structural problem
posed by sequential investment, at least where private solutions may be
more costly or less effective than law-supplied rules. This problem of
hold up is particularly likely to occur when the putative promisor seeks
Section 87. In Section 87 the drafters used the word "offer" to refer to cases in which the
Restatement will enforce offers that induce reliance, thereby suggesting that Section 90, if it
is to have any separate meaning and not be superfluous, must mean "promise" to refer to
commitments that do not rise to the level of a full-fledged offer and are therefore less fully
formed. Further, even beyond the textual arguments, to decide whether the Hoffman
court had any precedential support for construing "promise" in Section 90, to refer to a
commitment that did not reach the level of an offer, one would have to analyze case law.
Certainly, there are cases in which courts, prior to Hoffman, enforced promises and con-
strued language to constitute an actionable promise under Section 90 even if it did not
constitute an offer.
187. Thus, there may be social advantages for both parties to invest simultaneously.
188. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 685.
189. Id. at 686 (discussing the problem of credibility of promises to invest).
190. Id. at 685-86.
191. Id. at 686.
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investment from the promisee to alleviate uncertainty about the prom-
isee.192 The putative offeror makes promises intended to cause the other
party to invest sunk costs that can reduce uncertainty about the investing
party in a manner that will allow the promisor to decide whether to pro-
ceed at all, and if so, on what terms that will permit some other uncertain-
ties to be resolved or will allow one party to hedge. The parties may not
be in a position early on to agree on what each must invest' 93 since they
are not even sure that they are going to proceed.
Not being able to contract ahead of time on the investments poses
problems for investment.1 94 Contracts remain incomplete and fail to pro-
vide certain contractual protection for investments made. Another prob-
lem is that the best timing for the investment may not be clear ahead of
time, 195 and that uncertainty may mean that parties can act strategically
once investments have been made by one party. Other efforts to protect
specific investments may be unavailing as well. These might include an
effort to "contract on surplus" in such a way that the party investing more
ahead of time is given a "larger share" of the surplus ex post.' 96 Then,
even if contractual solutions were unavailing, parties could leave the com-
pensation issue to ex post negotiations. Such arrangements, however,
could discourage investment because they would present the classic
holdup problem since in those cases, "the investing party generally does
not appropriate the full marginal returns on the investment."'197
When a promisee invests at this preliminary stage and is not protected
by any contractual agreement, the problem of sequential investment
presents itself with its attendant risk of underinvestment and lost trading
opportunities. 198 Once the promisee invests, he faces the possibility that
no deal will materialize and he will lose his investment. Even if a deal
materializes, the investing party may not be able to recover all of the
benefits in the price. The investment will render him subject to a holdup
prospect. 199 All of this will lessen his incentive to invest and cause him to
forego trading opportunities unless safeguards are provided either
through private agreements or law-supplied default rules. The risk is the
same in all of these cases: the investing party will be subject to the other
party appropriating part of the benefit in the negotiated surplus.
192. This would be true even if there is no agreement to invest simultaneously.
193. This makes the investments non-contractible.
194. Che & Hausch, supra note 34, at 125 n.1 (detailing impediments to direct con-
tracting on the investments including the fact that "specific investments often take a non-
monetary, intangible form, such as human capital investment"). See also Rogerson, supra
note 121, at 777 (discussing need to make "non-contractible specific investments prior to
the transaction in order to prepare for it").
195. Rogerson, supra note 121, at 777.
196. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 678-79.
197. Guriev & Kvasov, supra note 124, at 1369.
198. See Bebchuck & Ben-Shahar, supra note 17, at 431-32.
199. The problem may be even more severe if there is a "mis-match" in surplus. See
Anderlini & Felli, supra note 146, at 230.
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In this recurring situation one can conceptualize the position of the
promisee and the putative promisor as one in which the promisee grants
the putative promisor the authority to proceed to collect enough informa-
tion, but only if the promisor will commit not to act opportunistically in
the pricing of the deal should a contract be achieved. A commitment to
refrain from acting opportunistically would not be credible because once
the investment is sunk, the promisee will not be able to earn all the bene-
fit from it.200 That promise would also be difficult to make credible in
part because courts might not enforce such a vague promise.20' Moreo-
ver, because of the uncertainty problem, promisees do not know how
trustworthy their counterparties are and thus, they do not know whether
the promisor's commitment should be trusted. If all of the possible sunk
costs that the promisor desired could be specified and priced in advance,
then the promisor might agree that the investing party will receive a
''nonnegative return by agreeing to reimburse the partner for investment
costs if the project is not pursued. ' 20 2 When such investments are "non-
contractible," for example, when the promisor urges the promisee to
"gear up" or "work hard," that solution will not work.203 The particular
problem of holdup occasioned by sequential investment, which occurs
when one party seeks to reduce its own uncertainty or to hedge, could be
cured if each party bargained over each incremental step and negotiated
a price to pay for such investment. Then investment would only occur on
the payment of a price and ex post holdup would not occur. The down-
side of bargaining in such a way is that it would be costly and add to the
transaction costs of preliminary negotiations. 204 When other solutions to
guard against holdup are not feasible or are too costly, the law could and
does imply a liability default rule that obligates the promisor to pay for
the sunk costs of the promisee (his reliance costs) through the legal doc-
trine of promissory estoppel.
In many successful promissory estoppel cases the parties do not agree
or map out an investment strategy, so there is no actual agreement be-
forehand about the investment strategy, but one party solicits invest-
ments to learn more about the party. Once those investments are made,
the investing party is subject to the holdup problem occasioned by se-
quential investment. If the parties proceed to a final deal, but the other
party waits until later to invest, the investing party will recover one-half
of the surplus, but less his investment, and the non-investing party will
recover one-half of the joint surplus and will profit by delay.
Because the putative promisor stands to benefit through a reduction in
uncertainty about the promisee from the sunk costs taken by the
200. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 686.
201. WILLIAMSON, supra note 4, at 63.
202. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 683.
203. Id.
204. See Juliet P. Kostritsky, Reshaping the Precontractual Liability Debate: Beyond
Short Run Economics, 58 U. PrrT. L. REV. 325, 368-69 (1997) (discussing the costs of in-
terim payments in incremental bargaining).
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counterparty, the sequence of the investment subjects the promisee to the
risk of hold up, the costs of private solutions negotiated on a case by case
basis are costly or not feasible, 20 5 and the risk is a generalized one affect-
ing many preliminary negotiations. Therefore, the law should and does
impose a generalized default rule making the soliciting party responsible
for the transaction-specific costs of the other party. 20 6 The putative prom-
isor benefits from this default rule,20 7 and it is presumably one that he
would bargain for to induce promisees to invest in ways that reduce un-
certainty for the promisor and encourage trade.
The risk that parties will act opportunistically, and in doing so discour-
age trade (unless parties can control such hazard at a reasonable cost) can
occur at different stages of negotiation. It may occur, as Schwartz and
Scott posit, when parties defect from an agreement to invest simultane-
ously following an initial preliminary agreement on some but not all
terms.
20 8
The risk, however, may also affect pre-contractual reliance that is dis-
tinct from the reliance on a preliminary agreement.20 9 The results of the
case law are consistent with a default rule protecting such reliance invest-
ments in both contexts. Courts take account of the uncertainty and hold
up problems in deciding cases in favor of plaintiffs bringing claims on
promissory estoppel or other substantive grounds in cases that lack a bar-
gained-for contract. This Article suggests that courts implicitly consider
the same elements when (1) they determine whether there has been a
breach of the obligation of good faith in preliminary agreement cases and
(2) whether to impose liability in the precontractual liability cases. This
universe of cases thus shares a unifying justificative framework 2 10 useful
in determining when pre-contractual reliance should be protected.
In deciding whether and why to impose liability for reliance invest-
ments that do not result in a contract, it is important to consider: (1) the
timing of the investment; (2) the precise way in which the hold up prob-
lem will manifest itself; (3) the incentive of the parties to undertake effi-
cient investments with and without a liability rule; and (4) whether a legal
intervention is needed to counteract incentives to act in ways that will
encourage inefficient investments.
205. See supra notes 192-204.
206. See supra note 80.
207. See Kostritsky, supra note 93, at 943 n.202.
208. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 686.
209. For a complete treatment of the available theories available to plaintiffs seeking
compensation for investments, see Farnsworth, supra note 3 (detailing unjust enrichment,
promissory statements, fraud, and general obligation as possible theories for precontrac-
tual reliance recovery actions).
210. See Ronald J. Coffey, Interventional Implementation, BAI Methodology (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author) (exploring fundamental attributes of justificational
analysis for legal intervention in private agreements); see also Peter M. Gerhart, An Intro-
duction to Justificational Analysis (Aug. 1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
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The problem of moral hazard thus exists outside the distinct factual
scenario identified by Schwartz and Scott and presents itself at all phases
of negotiation. It exists whenever one party "has a greater ability than
the other to delay a material portion of her work. '2 11 The potential for
one party to delay investment exists when the promisor is soliciting sunk
costs from the promisee in order to make determinations about whether
to proceed and if so, on what terms. Because of the relationship between
the promisor and the promisee, in which the promisor is gathering infor-
mation to formulate the terms of the offer, the promisee must provide
information in the form of investment (by reliance and sunk costs) in
order to enable the putative promisor to proceed to an offer. The prom-
isor has the discretion to delay making any investments of its own and to
hedge when uncertainties are greatest. 212
Promisors are all genuinely uncertain about qualities of promisees and
often they will not be able to assess accurately the chances for trade or
distinguish among possible contracting partners until they receive infor-
mation from promisees in the form of the reliance investment.2 13 Promis-
ors who are uncertain about the probability of a trade or about
contracting partners depend on information to resolve uncertainty. For
soliciting that benefit, they should be liable for the cost to the investing
party because it inevitably subjects the other party to hold up vulnerabil-
ity.2 14 What promisees require for investment is a commitment that they
will be compensated for their reliance investments if promisors encourage
them to invest;21 5 otherwise, they will hesitate to invest because of the
risk of holdup. The liability rule that makes the promisor liable for in-
duced reliance provides a law-supplied safeguard. It parallels protection
the law affords against strategic behavior that occurs when promisors
promise to invest simultaneously and then delay for private gains in ways
that reduce the potential surplus. In each case, the risk is that the strate-
gic behavior of one party will deter reliance in the future and discourage
trades.
It is the same risk that a party might have faced before the advent of
constructive conditions of exchange. Without constructive conditions, a
party who had not expressly stipulated that its performance was condi-
tional on the other party's performance could be forced to go forward
with its own performance, leaving itself vulnerable to the risk that the
other party would act opportunistically. Mansfield's famous doctrine of
constructive conditions of exchange-by making each party's duty of per-
formance constructively conditioned on the other party's similar perform-
ance-guaranteed against such risk.2 16
211. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 666 n.11.
212. See supra text accompanying note 92.
213. See infra cases in note 263.
214. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 683.
215. This limitation may curb the problems of excessive reliance.
216. See Kingston v. Preston, (1773) 99 Eng. Rep. 437, 438 (K.B.).
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The need for clarifying information exists when the promisor does not
actually know what the probability of a successful trade is. The promisor
will solicit investments in order to clarify that probability. Thus, the
problem is not necessarily one of misrepresenting the facts since the facts
are not yet known. Rather, it is the inherent structural risk that arises
whenever the promisor solicits information and the promisee invests,
leaving the investing party vulnerable to holdup.
One commentator, Jason Johnston, who has been concerned with the
same problem of providing solutions to encourage efficient reliance, has
suggested the solution of protecting pre-trade performance whenever the
promisor is aware of the performance and has not acted to actively dis-
courage such performance through sending a pessimistic message.217 The
aim is to discourage overly optimistic messages.2 18 Johnston's solution
advocates a rule making promisors liable for pre-trade performance in
order to flush out those promisors who are actually pessimists (for whom
the probability of trade is low) but are parading as optimists in the latter
stages of negotiation following a preliminary agreement in order to en-
courage promisees to invest by beginning to perform, and to encourage
other parties not part of the preliminary agreement to drop out.219 In
some ways, until that performance starts, sellers will all look the same;
220
the only way for the sellers to distinguish themselves in a meaningful way
to buyers is to begin performing.221 Because buyers need such informa-
tion to determine if a deal makes sense, buyers will send encouraging
messages to all sellers about the possibility of a trade without any factual
justification for doing so. 22 2 A liability rule would encourage pessimists
to speak out and to issue a pessimistic statement reflecting the actual low
probability of a deal.223 That would make sense because in those cases it
would be inefficient for promisees to rely because the chances of a trade
are too loW.
2 2 4
This Article suggests a default liability rule225 founded on a different
rationale. It seeks to solve the holdup problem posed by sequential in-
vestment and to control the opportunistic exploitation of such invest-
ments to gain information needed to reduce uncertainty.
In the early stages the need for information exists since the promisor
does not know what the probability of a successful trade is and will solicit
217. Johnston, supra note 15, at 499.
218. See id. at 494.
219. Jason Johnston provides this insight. Id. at 494. This will eliminate competitors.
220. Id. at 494 (explaining that sellers of services that are complex may remain indistin-
guishable to buyers until they actually start performing).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 498.
223. Id. at 495.
224. Id. at 494.
225. This suggested liability rule is not new. See Kostritsky, supra note 93. What is new
is that the author has undertaken a comprehensive search of the recent case law to deter-
mine whether case outcomes comport with the parameters of the liability rule suggested
here.
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investments in order to clarify that probability.226 The problem is not
necessarily one of misrepresenting the facts about the probability of trade
since the facts are not yet known. Instead, it is the inherent structural
risk that arises whenever the promisor solicits information and the prom-
isee invests, leaving the promisee vulnerable to holdup, and the non-in-
vesting party is relieved from actually paying anything for the benefits.
The promisor should be liable for sunk costs that are invested by the
promisee with no apparent gift motive when solicited by the promisor
unless the promisor gives notice to the promisee that it will not be re-
sponsible for such costs. Certainly, the promisor could easily add such a
disclaimer for such sunk costs. Adding such a disclaimer would be no
more costly than the flip-side equivalent of requiring the promisee to ne-
gotiate for the inclusion of an express clause that imposes liability for
sunk costs or a general form clause obligating the promisor to refrain
from acting opportunistically. However, unlike the general form clause
where the promisee might have trouble detecting whether the promise is
a credible one, the promise to refuse to cover costs would be credible as
the promisor would have no incentive to deny liability since it would dis-
courage the promisee from relying. All promisors need promisees to rely
early on. The liability rule can be rationalized as part of an implicit bar-
gain in which the promisor agrees to pay for investments that are useful
in resolving whether to go forward and in which the putative promisor
soliciting sunk costs has a way of making a credible commitment not to
opportunistically holdup a party who invests.
This liability rule will address a problem that is likely to arise in all
cases of solicited sunk costs when it is doubtful that the promisor has yet
any accurate assessment of the probability of trade. The law imposes lia-
bility, not to force pessimists to disclose their true assessment of the like-
lihood of a trade since such probability is unknown as yet, but because
such a rule will promote the parties' mutual welfare by encouraging in-
vestment from promisees who would otherwise decline to invest. This
rationale is not tied to the concealment issue but is grounded in efficiency
concerns.
227
226. Scholars have dealt with the reliance issue occurring in pre-contractual negotia-
tions from a number of different vantage points. Some have examined the parties' incen-
tives to make, and the courts' protection of, efficient reliance investments. See Craswell,
supra note 122. Others have focused on the optimal timing of reliance investments and the
regulatory role courts should play in protecting promisees who rely when the promisor has
all of the bargaining power. See Katz, supra note 13, at 1303-04.
227. Johnston also desired to promote the instrumental end of efficiency, but he aimed
to do so through a rule that will make pessimists disclose actual low probabilities of trade.
See Johnston, supra note 15, at 397.
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VI. THE HIDDEN ELEMENT AND CONNECTING THREAD
IN RELIANCE CASE LAW IN TWO PHASES OF
BARGAINING: THE CASE LAW REVISITED
A liability default rule 228 protecting reliance investments made in the
precontractual period of negotiation and solicited to reduce uncertainty
for the noninvesting party or to hedge pending the resolution of uncer-
tainty would encourage investment by promisees who would otherwise
invest sub-optimally. 22 9 The structural problem of hold up that occurs
when one party invests first in precontractual negotiation would be allevi-
ated. The danger that a promisee would invest and then not be able to
recoup the investment in the bargain price, since the bargain would ig-
nore sunk costs, 2 3 0 would be solved.
Courts have continued to protect such reliance investments in pre-con-
tractual negotiations in cases that resemble the Hoffman v. Red Owl case,
presenting a fact pattern in which the putative offeror solicits, and the
promisee makes, non-redeployable reliance investments to help the
promisor determine whether to proceed further, and if so, on what
terms.2 31 In many of these cases the law protects these investments
through the application of promissory estoppel case law.232 In some
cases, the law also protects such reliance and guards against the holdup
problem through the creative application of other doctrines, such as
restitution. 233
Because many recent scholars have posited the demise of promissory
estoppel as a viable cause of action, 234 and some recent commentators
228. This Article does not purport to decide which amongst several intermediate liabil-
ity rules would be optimal. See Bebchuck & Ben-Shahar, supra note 17, at 435-41 (discuss-
ing alternative liability regimes). Instead, it seeks to (1) demonstrate that there is support
for imposing liability in at least a subclass of reliance cases that are brought to trial and (2)
connect the successful reliance cases in precontractual negotiation to the related problem
of hold up when parties rely on a preliminary agreement and one party seeks to delay
investment.
229. Id. at 432.
230. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 666.
231. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1969).
232. The courts do so without any requirement that there be an "agreement." For a
contrary view, see Schwartz & Scott suggesting that the law denies compensation for such
investments absent an "agreement." See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 668.
233. See Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 231-33.
234. Prior analyses of the demise of promissory estoppel include several empirical stud-
ies. Sidney W. DeLong, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in Commercial
Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 943, 943; Robert A. Hill-
man, Questioning the "New Consensus" on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical and Theo-
retical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 588 (1998); see also Phuong N. Pham, Note, The
Waning of Promissory Estoppel, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1263, 1263 (1994). Schwartz and
Scott continue to question promissory estoppel as a viable cause of action. They argue that
the cases provide evidence that courts are unlikely to find liability for reliance costs in
cases that involve "reliance in the absence of any agreement by the parties regarding
terms." Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 671. Schwartz and Scott culled these cases
from a larger list that "examin[ed] all public case law data bases for preliminary negotia-
tion and preliminary agreement cases proceeding under the following theories of liability:
promissory estoppel, quantum meruit, implied contract, indefiniteness, and intent to be
bound." Id. at 671 n.30 (emphasis added). As they explain it, their "initial" search yielded
[Vol. 611410
20U] Uncertainty, Reliance, Preliminary Negotiations 1411
280 cases. Id. at 671. They then proceeded to isolate cases involving "reliance in the ab-
sence of any agreement by the parties regarding terms" and then found that when the
court failed to find an agreement, plaintiffs had a failure of rate of 87%. Id.
Their search may have undercounted cases involving promissory estoppel precontractual
cases in which parties rely, but without having reached any material terms in any kind of
preliminary agreement. If, as their article seems to indicate, their search proceeded first
under "preliminary negotiation" rather than conducting the initial search under promissory
estoppel or Section 90, fewer cases might have been identified. It may be that if the search
looked only at promissory estoppel when it appeared in a case also involving the particular
search terms "preliminary negotiation," the search would undercount the number of reli-
ance cases. This undercounting is consistent with my own study, which yielded 352 cases in
the same time period as the search conducted by Schwartz and Scott, using the search
terms "promissory estoppel" or "Restatement Section 90 w/10 and da (aft 1/1/99 and bf 12/
31/03)." Thus, if one searches for promissory estoppel that appears only in cases in which
the court also uses the term "preliminary negotiation," some cases that involve reliance
may be omitted. If a case did not involve the term "preliminary negotiation," it may have
been omitted from the Schwartz and Scott database even though it involved a case in
which a reliance or promissory estoppel claim was alleged and the plaintiff prevailed (ei-
ther on the merits or by surviving a defendant's motion for summary judgment). These
lists of cases are available on request from the author.
Perhaps equally important, calculating an 87% failure rate in cases in which the terms
are not agreed to may not tell us enough to be able to draw a firm conclusion that courts
require some sort of agreement to be in place for the court to grant reliance damages.
Certainly it is true that plaintiffs sometimes prevail when they allege a promissory estop-
pel claim as an alternative theory of recovery as a means of overcoming the defendant's
statute of frauds defense. In such cases, there may be an "agreement" which is not en-
forceable because of a technicality and the plaintiff prevails on a promissory estoppel
claim. See e.g., Amber Chem. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., No. 1:06-CV-06090, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14451, at *26 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2007) (finding that where an alleged oral require-
ments contract is never reduced to writing, a promissory estoppel claim is sufficient to
withstand the defendant's motion for summary judgment). But in other cases the absence
of a agreement per se may not be an obstacle to recovery. Instead, many of the cases
involving an absence of agreement also involve a failure of one or more of the key ele-
ments of Section 90, so the failure may be explained by the plaintiff's bringing a case that
lacks one of the elements of Section 90. This footnote will highlight the facts of various
cases cited by Schwartz and Scott as evidence that "in the absence of any agreement by the
parties regarding terms," the plaintiff will be unlikely to prevail. Schwartz & Scott, supra
note 19, at 671. While the cases may have involved an absence of agreement, one cannot
necessarily draw the conclusion that to succeed a plaintiff would have to show an agree-
ment. Later in the Article, and also in footnote 263, 1 highlight the types of cases in which,
despite the absence of agreement, a plaintiff bringing a reliance claim prevails. I tie the
success of those cases into a larger analytical framework exploring how uncertainty and
sequential investment, and the problem of holdup, can influence a court to find in favor of
a promissory estoppel claimant despite the absence of a traditional bargained-for agree-
ment. Many of the cases that show a low failure rate for reliance claims do not clearly
support the Schwartz and Scott conclusion that plaintiffs do not prevail on reliance claims
absent a showing of an agreement. Id. at 668. Instead, many of the cases cited as failures
do not reveal that courts require, as a condition of recovery, that the plaintiff demonstrate
agreement, but rather that plaintiffs will not succeed in a reliance claim if one of the prime
elements of promissory estoppel is lacking.
Because many of the non-preliminary agreement cases cited by Schwartz and Scott seem
to involve weak cases in which one or more elements of a Section 90 cause of action is
lacking, they do not reveal whether the court would have denied a claimant's cause of
action if it had met all of the elements of Section 90 but failed to prove agreement. If
Schwartz and Scott had been able to cite such cases, then their conclusion for courts requir-
ing agreement as a "necessary condition to a promisee's recovery" would have been
stronger. Id. at 668. For example, Abt Associates, Inc. v. JHPIEGO Corp., 104 F. Supp. 2d
523 (D. Md. 2000), a case cited by Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 672 n.31, is a weak
case not because it lacks a traditional agreement, but because the plaintiff cannot demon-
strate any detriment. In Abt Associates, the plaintiff had no reliance damages because all
of the pre-breakdown costs were covered and paid by the defendant. Since the promise
TT ..........
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that was made to cover pre-agreement expenses was fulfilled, promissory estoppel, which
grants recovery for broken promises, was not available. Id. at 533. The Abt Associates case
seems to be a particularly weak one since the court found no "demonstrable detriment";
there was an initial presubcontract "which was fully performed"; and this was not a case in
which the plaintiff took steps and incurred expenditures that benefited the defendant and
for which the plaintiff would not be compensated if the court failed to find liability under
promissory estoppel, since the pre-subcontract provided compensation to the plaintiff. Id.
at 536, 531. Thus, Abt Associates and other cases cited as evidence of the high failure rate
of reliance claims in the absence of agreement or deceit instead stand for evidence that
promissory estoppel will not succeed when one of the major elements of the claim is ab-
sent. See also Beer Capitol Distrib., Inc. v. Guiness Bass Import Co., 290 F.3d 877, 879 (7th
Cir. 2002) (cited by Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 672 n.31) (finding that a statement
by beer company that plaintiff was the "leading candidate," and a question by the defen-
dant inquiring whether plaintiff "would be willing to pay 2 to 9 times earnings ... to gain
an exclusive" right did not constitute an actionable promise so promissory estoppel cause
of action would not lie); Banco Espirito Santo de Investimento, S.A. v. Citibank, N.A., No.
03 Civ. 1537, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23062, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2003) (cited by
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 672 n.31) (finding that where letter of intent contained
an express denial of any motivating factors for the purchase of notes other than those
included in the express materials and such signed materials, including the offering memo-
randa, contained express disclaimers of any reliance on defendant's representations, plain-
tiff's reliance was unreasonable); Fimon v. Kenroc Drywall Supplies, Inc., No. C7-02-1588,
2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 311, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2003) (ruling against plaintiffs
on a promissory estoppel claim for a 5% ownership interest when the plaintiffs "testified in
depositions that they did not remember or recall any specific details of their conversation
with the [defendant] corporation's president about their ownership interest," cited no spe-
cific promises-thereby making reliance unreasonable, took no risks in the start up, and
were paid in the form of bonuses). Cases that are lacking one of the elements such as the
three cases cited here (promise, harm, etc.) do not support the proposition that absent
agreement, a court will not find promissory estoppel. Even absent agreement in the midst
of preliminary negotiations, parties can prevail on a promissory estoppel claim if the other
elements are met. See infra cases cited in note 263.
To prove the claim that absent agreement or deceit, plaintiffs cannot prevail on a prom-
issory estoppel claim, Schwartz and Scott would need to find cases in which the plaintiffs
can show all of the elements of promissory estoppel (including promise, reasonable reli-
ance, and foreseeability of reliance) and yet the plaintiffs lose their claims without a show-
ing that there is an "agreement" or deceit. When plaintiffs lose a claim, as in Beer Capitol,
because there is no promise, or only a weak promise, there is no indication in the holding
itself that in order to prevail on a promissory estoppel claim, the plaintiffs must demon-
strate that an agreement exists. See Beer Capitol, 290 F.3d at 880.
Alternatively, to demonstrate the proposition that, absent an agreement, plaintiffs can-
not prevail on a promissory estoppel claim, Schwartz and Scott could point to case out-
comes in which the plaintiff met all of the elements of a promissory estoppel claim but lost
nonetheless because there was "no agreement." See Jody Kraus, The Methodological Com-
mitments of Contemporary Contract Law, 12-15 (Law & Econ. Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 01-2, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.tafabstract-id=
269975 (discussing efficiency theorists' interest in rationalizing case outcomes). Schwartz
and Scott could rest their conclusion on actual language in a case denying recovery in cases
where the elements were met but the plaintiff nonetheless lost because a court explicitly
articulated that the plaintiff's loss was due to the failure to prove "an agreement." How-
ever, the cases that Schwartz and Scott cite in their article do not fall into either category.
Courts do not appear to require "agreement" as a pre-condition to recovery either in the
articulated holding, nor is the requirement of an agreement reflected in the outcomes of
cases. Without identifying a pattern of cases in which plaintiffs bring strong claims with a
definite promise, foreseeable and jusitifiable reliance, and detriment (loss), but then lose
because the courts seem to require, either explicitly or implicitly, the showing of an agree-
ment, it is hard to understand the support for their thesis that agreement is a precondition
to recovery in precontractual negotiation cases. Cases like Beer Capitol involve the ab-
sence of a promise, and, of course, without a promise to begin with there can be no agree-
ment. However, the presence of recovery in cases where the elements are met but there is
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have argued that "[c]ourts actually make some form of agreement a nec-
essary condition to a promisee's recovery, ' 235 this Article re-examines
recent case law236 to see if the results support the view that courts allow
claimants to recover for reliance only if the court finds "agreement" or if
the defendant breached a promise to invest simultaneously-the template
of liability envisioned by Schwartz and Scott.237 This Article identifies a
subset of cases where promissory estoppel is likely to succeed in precon-
tractual negotiation despite the absence of an agreement or a promise to
invest simultaneously. It offers a rationale for the success in such cases
that is based on the parties' hypothetical consent to prevent a sequential
investment holdup problem that would otherwise occur. If a subset of
precontractual negotiation cases presenting the sequential investment/
holdup problem is isolated analytically from the "preliminary agreement"
cases,238 then it appears that promissory estoppel protects reliance, with-
out regard to whether a court finds that an agreement exists or whether
there is an agreement to invest simultaneously. 239
no agreement, discussed in infra note 263, suggest that agreement is not a sine qua non of a
promissory estoppel recovery.
235. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 668.
236. The cases that I looked at came from a list of cases identified by Lexis and Westlaw
searches for the period 1999-2007. The search terms included Restatement 90 and promis-
sory estoppel. I read cases identified by my research assistants as relevant and meeting the
criteria I had outlined. I also Shephardized important cases such as Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1969) and Esquire Radio & Electronics, Inc. v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., 804 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1986) to identify other cases to read. I also read
cases identified and discussed in the text or the footnotes by Schwartz and Scott in their
article, as important paradigm cases in their theory of when reliance claims succeeded in
cases involving preliminary agreements. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19.
237. See id. at 666-67.
238. Preliminary agreement cases tend to concern letter of intent cases where "parties
often reach substantial agreement before they make reliance investments." Id. at 693. In
contrast, this Article focuses on reliance investments made at a prior stage, where uncer-
tainty is greater, thereby precluding any preliminary agreement. The fact patterns in
Schwartz and Scott's article often arise in cases that courts treat under the doctrinal label
of "preliminary agreement" cases. Id. at 694. The courts are trying to ascertain whether
the parties have reached an agreement that the parties intended to be binding despite the
failure to agree on certain terms. If that intent can be found, the parties are not then
seeking reliance investments to resolve remaining uncertainty since they have indicated
assent and a willingness to go forward without resolving uncertainty. The remaining negoti-
ations often concern how the surplus will be split.
239. It is not completely clear what Schwartz and Scott mean by "agreement" in this
context. They could be referring to a full fledged explicitly reciprocal contract, though in
such a case it would be difficult to see why the plaintiff was bringing a promissory estoppel
claim except in cases involving a failure to meet an applicable statute of frauds require-
ment. Alternatively, they could be referring to the presence of an agreement that fell short
of the ultimate agreement but did reach consensus on some terms. Again, it is difficult to
know why these cases would be relevant to precontractual negotiation cases, which seem to
evolve in the absence of any preliminary agreement. The broad claim by Schwartz and
Scott that reliance claims rarely succeed absent an agreement does not seem to be sup-
ported by the case law. Instead, the cases cited tend to demonstrate that promissory estop-
pel claims tend to fail when one of the elements of promissory estoppel is weak. If the
promise is weak or unreliable, the reliance claim will fail. See, e.g., Beer Capitol Distrib.,
Inc., v. Guiness Bass Import Co., 290 F.3d 877, 879-80 (2002) (finding that statement that
plaintiff was "leading candidate" for a distributorship was not actionable promise).
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Success is also unlikely if the agreement specifically indicates that reliance expenditures
in the precontractual period will not be compensated (a type of disclaimer) or that the
agreement is not legally binding or if there is an absolute right to terminate. See, e.g.,
Universal Reinsurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., No. 95 CIV. 8436, 1999
WL 771357, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1999). These results make sense if one wants to
discourage unreasonable reliance by promisees who have been alerted that the agreement
has no binding effect.
The plaintiff is also going to lose on a promissory estoppel claim when the court finds the
reliance to be unreasonable and there is no evidence that the defendant, in order to hedge
or reduce its own uncertainty, solicited reliance investments by the plaintiff. For example,
see Indus. Maxifreight Servs., LLC v. Tenneco Auto. Operating Co., Inc., 182 F. Supp. 2d
630, 636 (W.D. Mich. 2002), where the court found reliance by lessor on lessee's promise to
lease was unreasonable in light of unrebutted evidence of repeated statements by lessee
that home office approval was needed for the lease. Schwartz and Scott cited Maxifreight
as evidence of case data that "show that, absent misrepresentation or deceit, there gener-
ally is no liability for inducing reliance investments." Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at
672. Maxifreight really concerned a case in which the plaintiff's alleged reliance took place
largely "prior to the initial lease discussions." Maxifreight, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 636. The
case therefore does not present the Hoffman paradigm, in which the defendant induces the
plaintiff to take reliance steps that benefit the defendant by allowing it to hedge pending
the resolution of uncertainty, or actually diminish uncertainty about the plaintiff by shed-
ding light on the plaintiff's characteristics. Thus, the case is not a compelling case for the
application of a liability default rule since it does not present the same risk of hold up.
Schwartz and Scott cited Galaxy Networks, Inc. v. Kenan System Corp., Nos. 97-56386,
97-56435, 2000 WL 714554 (9th Cir. June 2, 2000), as a case that "granted the defendant's
motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's breach of contract claims." Schwartz &
Scott, supra note 19, at 672 n.31.
Yet the Galaxy case is not a case that fits the paradigm of precontractual negotiations in
the Hoffman paradigm/mode and indicates very little about whether and under what cir-
cumstances a plaintiff could prevail in early negotiation. Galaxy was clearly a case in which
the parties were negotiating piecemeal and had reached agreement on some but not all
terms, but clearly intended to reach a fully enforceable future agreement that did agree to
all material terms. Galaxy, 2000 WL 714554, at *2. Because Schwartz and Scott treated
the case as one in which "there is no legal obligation until such future agreement is made,"
it really says very little about how a court would approach the question of liability when
parties were not at the point where they were able to agree on certain terms but reserve
agreement on others for the future. Id. (citation omitted). Cases like Hoffman, which
involve parties who are making promises and assurances on which others rely in order to
reduce uncertainty for the promisor, are very different from a case like Galaxy. When
parties are striving to reach a fully enforceable complete agreement in the future but reach
agreement on such matters early on, there is always the question of whether they intend
the agreement on some terms to be enforceable as stand alone clauses or whether those
terms are not enforceable until a binding complete agreement is reached. In such negotia-
tions, there is always a risk that a party who got the counterparty to agree to some terms
would then try to enforce those terms without regard to whether the parties ever reached
an agreement on the remaining terms. Enforceability of the individual clauses can bind a
party to a term that they would never have agreed to unless other pieces of the agreement
were forthcoming. See PFT Robertson, Inc. v. Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. 420 F.3d 728,
731-32 (7th Cir. 2005) (opinion by Easterbrook, J.) (cited in Schwartz and Scott, supra note
19, at 664 for a discussion of this risk).
The plaintiff in Galaxy never brought a claim for a reliance cause of action and the court
never addressed whether a reliance or Section 90 cause of action would lie. Thus, an ad-
verse judgment for the plaintiff on a breach of contract action says little about what result a
court might reach in a case involving no agreement on interim terms, but rather a case
from an earlier stage of negotiations involving a possible hold up due to sequential invest-
ment. Therefore, the plaintiff's loss in a claim involving preliminary negotiations that re-
sulted in agreement on some terms, but which were negotiated and agreed to with the
expectation that a final agreement would resolve other issues in comprehensive way, does
not shed light on how a court would decide a case that involved promises and reliance but
not a claim by to enforce separately agreed on material terms, absent the more complete
agreement without which the interim agreement might not make sense.
Uncertainty, Reliance, Preliminary Negotiations
The difficulty with some of the cases cited by Schwartz and Scott to
support the proposition that "courts actually make some form of agree-
ment a necessary condition to a promisee's recovery '240 is that the cases
do not support the proposition if broadly interpreted. Instead, the pro-
position seems to be accurate if one focuses only on a subset of cases in
which the parties are engaged in preliminary negotiations whose major
efforts were directed at reaching a final written contract, and one party
attempted to recover on the basis of an interim agreement when there
was no final contract embodying agreement on all of the terms. If the
case does not have a fact pattern involving preliminary agreement on
some points with final agreement postponed on others because the par-
ties understand that they would not be bound until the final, complete
agreement, then a court is free to reach a different result (i.e., liability).
In such cases, courts do not seem to require that a promisee in a reliance
cause of action under Section 90 establish an "agreement" as a precondi-
tion to recovery.
PFT Roberson Inc. v. Volvo Trucks is a case of the first kind-the par-
ties were negotiating toward a final agreement-and the court denied re-
covery to the plaintiff who tried to argue that certain interim emails were
binding.241 In PFT Robertson, an operator of long-haul trucks that de-
rived its trucks and maintenance from Freightliner began negotiations
with Volvo when its initial fleet agreement with Freightliner was termi-
nated. 242 Those negotiations consisted partly of emails signifying agree-
ment on some individual issues, though no comprehensive final
agreement was ever reached or signed by the parties.2 4 3 The truck opera-
tor later argued that the emails at least raised a jury question as to
"whether there [was] a contract" on each of the individually agreed to
terms.2
44
Judge Easterbrook found that because it was clear that the parties were
negotiating toward a final "global '245 agreement, their emails reciting
agreement on some individual terms did not demonstrate an intention by
If expenses are not transaction specific, do not involve significant expense, can be
redeployed, or are merely preparatory, or if some other element required for a successful
reliance claim on promissory estoppel is absent from the facts, success is also unlikely.
The failure to succeed in the cases cited by Schwartz and Scott indicates that the plain-
tiffs brought weak claims. In some cases the plaintiffs brought a claim in which the prom-
ise was ambiguous or really not a promise at all, and it was not clear why the plaintiffs
brought the case. In other cases the plaintiffs brought claims that might be justified by the
actual language of Section 90, but the claims failed because case law has grafted on addi-
tional nuance as to how the elements are interpreted. Courts may require the reliance
taken to constitute sunk costs that are not redeployable or they may require the reliance to
have advanced beyond the merely preparatory investigation that each side normally takes
at its own risk. Losses in cases that do not meet the elements required of reliance claims
do not indicate that reliance claims are no longer winnable.
240. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 668.
241. 420 F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 2005).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 728.
244. Id. at 732.
245. Id. at 730.
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the parties to create binding and enforceable agreements on such individ-
ual terms in advance of a comprehensive agreement. 246 Summary judg-
ment was therefore appropriate. 247
But citing a case like PFT Roberson to support a proposition, as
Schwartz and Scott have,248 that preliminary negotiations in which the
parties "have discussed a deal but have not agreed to one" 249 will deny
the disappointed party all recovery, proves too much on the one hand,
and on the other hand reveals very little about when parties engaged in
preliminary negotiations, even absent agreement, will succeed. When
parties reach agreement on a series of issues in stages250 but always in-
tend that there will be a final binding comprehensive agreement, allowing
a party to insist that the individually negotiated separate points of agree-
ment were enforceable as a contract would, as Judge Easterbrook ex-
plains, be equivalent to
[l]etting one side accept the favorable terms without the compensa-
tory ones [and] would be like permitting the buyer to say: 'We have
agreed on quantity but not price; I now accept the quantity term and
am entitled to the goods at whatever price a jury thinks reasonable.'
Firms do not ... put themselves at the mercy of their counterparts in
that way.251
Judge Easterbrook found no liability on the individually-created points
of interim agreements when the parties were negotiating toward a final
contract and made their agreement subject to further resolution at the
stage of the final agreement. This says very little about how courts should
or do decide cases in which the parties are engaged in preliminary negoti-
ations but have not discussed the details of a deal and their efforts are not
done in the shadow of, or subject to, a looming final negotiated agree-
ment, but rather involve preliminary promises and reliance. Schwartz
and Scott's statement that when parties "have discussed a deal but have
not agreed to one" they are denied recovery252 should be read very nar-
rowly to apply only to cases where the parties are negotiating on a series
of points towards a final written agreement and then one party seeks to
impose contract liability on the other party on the basis of individually
agreed to points, even though it was clear that there was to be no liability
absent a comprehensive agreement. This Article posits that the state-
ment by Schwartz and Scott proves too much when it suggests that the
absence of agreement would mean no liability.2 53 In actuality, it is not
really the absence of agreement that defeats recovery so much as it is the
fact that when it is clear to everyone that there was to be no contract
246. Id. at 731-32.
247. Id.
248. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 664 n.4.
249. Id. at 664.
250. PFT Robertson, 420 F.3d at 731.
251. Id. at 732.
252. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 664.
253. Id.
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liability without a comprehensive agreement, a plaintiff will not succeed
absent such agreement.
Thus, the suggestion that there will be no liability "absent agreement"
is far too broad a statement to address whether there is or should be
liability in precontractual negotiations when the parties have not even
begun to negotiate individual points that may make up the final agree-
ment, or to zero in on such terms with the understanding that liability will
await a comprehensive agreement. Rather, the fact pattern involves reli-
ance on promises made early on in these contexts. Here, Schwartz and
Scott are willing to admit that there might be liability, although their
overall thesis is that agreement is a precondition for recovery in prelimi-
nary negotiation cases. 254 In fact, Schwartz and Scott admit that there
may be liability for induced reliance if a misrepresentation or promise is
present. 255 If so, and liability exists on the basis of induced reliance on
promises, and those cases do not involve an agreement, then the state-
ment that courts will not find liability for preliminary negotiations absent
agreement is too broad. Perhaps courts will not find liability absent an
agreement when the preliminary negotiations are all conducted in the
shadow of and directed toward a final agreement, and there is evidence
that the parties did not intend any interim preliminary agreement to be
binding absent a final complete agreement. If that more narrow interpre-
tation is accepted, then the following question still remains an open one:
what results do courts reach in preliminary negotiations, in Hoffman-type
cases, and why are those outcomes justifiable?
Without a liability rule (imposed through promissory estoppel) or an
explicit side agreement/payment to prevent opportunistic exploitation of
sunk costs, promisees will underinvest and the promisor's ability to re-
duce uncertainty in preliminary negotiation would be diminished. Be-
cause the default rule can be rationalized as part of an implicit
contract, 256 it would make sense that precontractual reliance claims have
less traction and success in cases in which parties are operating on the
basis of letters of intent or exchanged drafts and have an express or im-
plied desire to postpone enforceability until a forthcoming formal con-
tract is achieved. The presence of letters of intent or exchanged drafts,
particularly in cases where the court finds no intent to have an enforcea-
ble agreement absent a more complete formal agreement, would render
reliance on such preliminary agreements unjustified or unreasonable and,
therefore, non-compensable.
Nevertheless, in some preliminary agreement cases, at least those in
which courts find that the presence of a binding agreement imposes an
obligation to bargain in good faith and to compensate a party who has
invested when the other party has breached its obligation to invest at the
254. Id.
255. Id. at 664 n.4.
256. For a discussion of implicit contracting and the literature on that topic, see Juliet P.
Kostritsky, supra note 93, at 905 n.28.
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same time, the court's goal in finding bad faith is to prevent opportunistic
behavior. The law provides a safeguard through a liability rule as a way
of protecting against one form of strategic behavior that occurs after a
preliminary agreement is entered into and a joint plan of simultaneous
investment is agreed to but then breached by one party who defers
investment.
The emerging case law on breaches of promises to invest simultane-
ously made at the same time or after a binding preliminary agreement has
led Schwartz and Scott to argue that lawyers should turn their misplaced
attention away from precontractual preliminary negotiation Hoffman-
type cases. The focus should instead be on the preliminary agreements
that are accompanied by a promise to invest simultaneously. This goal is
the same one that animates the imposition of a liability rule to govern
early precontractual negotiations to prevent hold up by compensating a
promisee whose sunk costs have been solicited to reduce promisor uncer-
tainty. In both instances courts have demonstrated a willingness to pro-
tect reliance investments to prevent hold up.
Nevertheless, commentators have argued against the expansion of
promissory estoppel. They have advanced several arguments about prom-
issory estoppel claims: that they rarely succeed in the case law,257 that
liability has gone too far,2 58 that the current doctrinal scheme is too un-
certain,259 that promissory liability will chill negotiation, 260 or that there
is only a "myth of pre-contractual reliance. '2 61
Contrary to the belief of recent scholars who argue that judicial protec-
tion of precontractual reliance investments absent an agreement is merely
a "myth," 262 courts routinely protect transaction-specific precontractual
reliance investments when they are solicited by promisors in cases where
the investments in precontractual negotiations by the promisee will leave
it vulnerable to hold up by the other party. Promissory estoppel does and
should play an important role in these contexts.
The criticisms of promissory estoppel-including the idea that it has
been a colossal failure in the cases-have gained traction in part because
all types of promissory estoppel reliance cases have been lumped to-
gether. Reliance cases in which one or more of the doctrinal elements is
lacking have been lumped together with cases involving preliminary
agreements in which the parties may have intended no contractual liabil-
ity until the final complete contract and reliance cases in which the plain-
tiff presents a strong or plausible case. At the same time, reliance cases
257. Hillman, supra note 234, at 580, 588-89.
258. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 669-70.
259. Id. at 663.
260. Johnston, supra note 15, at 493.
261. Robert E. Scott, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and the Myth of Precontractual Reli-
ance, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 71 (2007).
262. See id Certainly cases do exist in which there are agreements and reliance. Often
these involve contracts that are not enforceable under the statute of frauds, where the
court chooses to protect the promisee's reliance.
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have been artificially segregated by recent authors into two separate cate-
gories: those involving reliance in precontractual negotiations, and those
involving reliance following a binding preliminary agreement reached af-
ter an agreement to invest simultaneously and one party defects. There
has been little understanding of how the cases may be linked conceptually
through the analytical link of preventing hold up. Thus, when commenta-
tors link all promissory estoppel/reliance cases involving precontractual
preliminary negotiations into one category and fail to separate out de-
monstrably weak cases from that set, the reader gains a distorted view of
whether and when a reliance claim will succeed. It would be helpful in-
stead if scholars focused on when reliance claims succeed and why. This
Article argues that where one party, deciding whether to proceed with a
transaction, seeks to reduce uncertainty for itself or to hedge in the nego-
tiation process by soliciting sunk cost investments from the other party,
promissory estoppel is and should be particularly likely to succeed 263 if
263. Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 732-735 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that plaintiff
proved reliance sufficient to support jury's award of damages for promissory estoppel
where plaintiff promised to make a $100,000 loan and provided significant legal advice, and
defendant faced many uncertainties, including: whether or not the restaurant would suc-
ceed or fail; whether defendant could secure a bank loan; and what type of legal services
would be needed; and where defendant benefited greatly because (1) it was able to secure
whatever legal services were needed; (2) had a commitment to receive $100,000 in the
event that it did not receive a bank loan; and (3) the pledge of a $100,000 loan from plain-
tiff possibly helped defendant obtain the bank financing); Esquire Radio & Elecs., Inc. v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 804 F.2d 787, 791-795 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding that a promissory
estoppel claim was properly submitted to a jury where defendant, uncertain of whether
plaintiff would provide spare parts for competitors and arguably uncertain of the quantity
of spare parts it would need, assured plaintiff that it would purchase the spare parts that
plaintiff imported and stored, and in reliance upon that, plaintiff phased out its work with
other competitors and allowed its spare parts inventories to accumulate over the course of
a twenty-year, informal buy-back arrangement); Amber Chem. Inc. v. Reilly Indus., Inc.,
No. 1:06-CV-06090, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14451, at *16-26 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2007) (find-
ing that where a defendant's promise to plaintiff to supply a product for a year if plaintiff
purchased as much as in the prior year allowed defendant to hedge; if the sale to a third
party of that part of the business did not work out, defendant had guaranteed sales to
plaintiff, and if the sale went through, defendant could insulate itself from liability by
pleading absence of a contract; promissory estoppel claim withstood defendant's motion
for summary judgment); Henneberry v. Sumitomo Corp. of Am., 415 F. Supp. 2d 423, 456-
459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that a claim of promissory estoppel could survive summaryjudgment where plaintiff, in reliance on expectation of defendants' three to five million-
dollar investment, filed a restated certificate of incorporation as directed by defendant,
convinced its shareholders to subordinate their class of shares to defendants,' convinced its
original investors to reduce or forego dividends and invest more money, advised other
investors that plaintiff had accepted defendant's offer and that more investments were to
follow, and made a bridge loan for $100,000 and defendant was also uncertain that plaintiff
could run the company); Cin-Doo, Inc. v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. Civ. 04-CV-50-SM, 2005 WL
768592, at *4 (D.N.H. Apr. 6, 2005) (finding plaintiff's request for injunctive relief based
on promissory estoppel could survive summary judgment where defendant, uncertain
about future of 7-Eleven store and about plaintiff franchisee's willingness to support a
reconstruction, assured plaintiff that a complete reconstruction of the store would happen
and that it would be beneficial; and plaintiff, in reliance, did not object to a transfer of real
estate from the 7-Eleven to a neighboring Home Depot and sold another 7-Eleven in antic-
ipation of increased profits from the reconstructed store); Carey v. FedEx Ground Package
Sys. Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 902, 922-24 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (finding that where plaintiff wanted
a delivery contract with a shipping company and was given repeated assurances that a
route would be available, plaintiff relied by purchasing a van and took other steps such as
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finding back up drivers, and plaintiff's steps permitted defendant to hedge during an initial
period of uncertainty while deciding on which driver would be best for the available routes,
plaintiff withstood defendant's motion for summary judgment by prevailing on a claim of
promissory estoppel); Nutrition Mgmt. v. Harborside Healthcare Corp., No. Civ. A. 01-
CV-0902, 2004 WL 764809, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2004) (finding plaintiff's claim for
promissory estoppel survives summary judgment where defendant induced plaintiff to con-
tinue to provide food operation services for its healthcare facilities based on assurance of
long term relationship, and plaintiff relied on this by continuing to provide food services
even though there was dispute over payments and plaintiff was operating at a loss); Robin-
son v. Detroit News, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 101, 107-09 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding that plaintiff's
promissory estoppel claim withstood summary judgment when defendant hires plaintiff
despite uncertainty about her transactional skills and promised to train her in needed skills;
plaintiff's reliance allowed defendant to hedge while it determined if others are available
to do transactional work); Zeman v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 699 P.2d 1274, 1283-86
(Ala. 1985) (denying summary judgment to the defendant in a promissory estoppel action
where defendant made promises that induced action by the plaintiff and that also allowed
defendant to postpone any contract until uncertainty about whether the plaintiff could
finish the construction of apartments to accommodate plaintiff's airline crews); Schade v.
Dietrich, No. 1 CA-CIV. 8478, 1987 Ariz. App. LEXIS 667, at *3.40 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan.
15, 1987) (finding that where plaintiff asked to resign but defendant wanted plaintiff to
continue working on a project and defendant offered "appropriate" but still uncertain sev-
erance benefits and defendant benefited from plaintiff's work while details of severance
worked out, plaintiff's reliance on the promised severance package entitled plaintiff to
recover under Section 90); Sprouts for Better Living, LLC v. Lake Hills Shopping Ctr., No.
CV040408837S, 2005 WL 2008871, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 11, 2005) (finding claim for
promissory estoppel could withstand summary judgment where defendant, a shopping
center uncertain that it could accommodate a Trader Joe's, induced plaintiff to relinquish
half of its space prior to the expiration of the lease); Chrysler Corp. v. Chaplake Holdings,
Ltd., 822 A.2d 1024, 1033 (Del. 2003) (finding that where defendant was unsure of how
expansion plans for selling more Lamborghinis would develop and offered assurances to
plaintiff that continued exclusivity in selling rights would depend on plaintiff's demonstrat-
ing capacity for expansion and plaintiff relied on promises by making significant invest-
ments in "operational capacity," court affirmed jury verdict for promissory estoppel as
plaintiff's investments permitted the defendant to hedge by having plaintiff ready for in-
creased sales if the expansion plans went through); Ramone v. Lang, No. Civ. A. 1592-N,
2006 WL 905347, at *14-19 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3, 2006) (finding plaintiff was entitled to reliance
damages for claim of promissory estoppel where he put out flyers and made plans for a
swim camp at a pool that he intended to lease from or buy with defendant, and where
defendant was uncertain that he could get zoning approval for the project, frequently rep-
resented to the media and city officials that the plaintiff would be involved in the project,
and plaintiff's good reputation helped defendant obtain zoning approval and buy the build-
ing); Christiana Marine Serv. Corp. v. Texaco Fuel & Marine Mktg. Inc., No, 98C-02-
217WCC, 2004 Del. Super. LEXIS, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 8, 2004) (finding that where
defendant wanted plaintiff to act as defendant's exclusive provider of bunker transporta-
tion and wanted assurance that plaintiff could meet defendant's needs for transportation,
and defendant assured plaintiff that it planned to put through 200,000 barrels of oil
monthly but remained uncertain about what its equipment needs would be, plaintiff's reli-
ance allowed defendant to hedge and to benefit from having an entire line of barges wait-
ing for them, and defendant did not need to pay, and fees and secured reduced rate
promissory estoppel judgment affirmed); Kirkpatrick v. Seneca Nat'l Bank, 515 P.2d 781,
785-88 (Kan. 1973) (finding that where defendant bank lacks information about whether to
shut down a line of credit for a customer/debtor and defendant solicited accounting ser-
vices from plaintiff to clarify financial situation of customer and promises payment, prom-
issory estoppel justified judgment for plaintiff; plaintiff's services permitted defendant to
hedge pending resolution of uncertainty about the finances of the debtor); Dickson v.
Comair, Inc., No. 2001-CA-002354-MR, 2003 WL 21471979, at *1, 7 (Ky. Ct. App. June 27,
2003) (finding that summary judgment was granted against plaintiff in error where defen-
dant, an airline carrier unsure of the commitment of its supervisors, assured plaintiff that if
she relinquished her twelve years of seniority to become a supervisor that the seniority
could be reinstated if her job were ever effectively eliminated); Jackson v. Morse, 871 A.2d
47, 49-53 (N.H. 2005), affg in part, vacating in part, No. Civ. 03-264-JD, 2003 WL 21735448
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the other elements are present, including a definite promise, justifiable
reliance, and demonstrable detriment.
This section will look at cases involving preliminary agreements and
precontractual reliance to see how these cases are resolved. It will also
consider the cases involving promises to invest simultaneously when
those promises are made in connection with a binding preliminary agree-
ment-the cases discussed by Schwartz and Scott. The thread that con-
nects protection for reliance investments at these different stages of the
contracting process is the prevention of opportunism and holdup. It can
occur when one party who has entered into a preliminary agreement
chooses to delay investment for strategic reasons, thereby leaving the in-
vesting party vulnerable to holdup. Holdup can also occur at the begin-
ning of the negotiating process where no preliminary agreement exists
because the uncertainties are too great and one party invests at the other
party's request, leaving the investing party unable to recoup all those
costs as the requesting party captures part of them in the surplus.
The success of claimants in both types of cases can be rationalized as a
means of improving welfare. Without a liability rule, underinvestment ex
ante is likely to occur because the investing party fears the expropriation
of its sunk costs and hold up. The problem of sequential investment
where one party, the putative promisor, delays its own investment while
securing sunk costs invested by the promisee, suggests that a liability de-
fault rule should govern these cases. 264 It would mitigate the potential
for lost trades and underinvestment that inevitably accompany a sequen-
tial investment sequence where the promisor has the ability to defer any
investment until it can be fully recouped in a bargain. The very same
danger of lost trading opportunities is presented by the scenario in which
(D.N.H. July 28, 2003) (finding plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to expectation dam-
ages on their claim of promissory estoppel where defendant, uncertain of whether plaintiffs
would choose to invest their funds with him, promised to make up the shortfall if value of
investment account was below $62,000 dollars so long as plaintiffs agreed to give him total
control of the account, and plaintiffs relied on this promise by giving him total control of
the account); Taylor Box Co. v. SAR Group Ltd., No. CA. 2002-1033, 2005 WL 705991, at
*4-7 (R.I. Super. Mar. 25, 2005) (finding defendant liable, based on promissory estoppel,
for expenses incurred by plaintiff manufacturer even though no agreement or contract
where defendant, uncertain of whether it could find a manufacturer for a DVD box that
was a "better value" than its current box, told plaintiff that it would order 2,000 boxes, and
in ongoing conversations led plaintiff to believe there was a deal). See also infra notes 309-
34.
Older cases that fit this pattern of allowing recovery when a defendant solicits actions
that are valuable to the defendant in allowing it to hedge (and postpone a commitment on
the ultimate project) until a later point in time include: Goldstick v. ICM Realty, 788 F.2d
456 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing defendant's promise, which induced plaintiffs to release
claim for legal fees and allowed defendant to hedge on any commitment to the plaintiff
while the defendant secured valuable information and removed an obstacle to a transac-
tion with a third party); Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 144 A.2d 123 (Del. 1958) (finding that
defendant's assurances secured cooperation of plaintiff and allowed defendant to identify
the shareholders of a dealership). See also cases cited in Kostritsky, supra note 93, at 943
n.202.
264. See Smirov & Wait, supra note 144, at 399 (suggesting that "[tihe disadvantage of
staging [sequencing of investment] is that it reduces the payoff of the first mover").
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two parties enter into an agreement to invest simultaneously and one
party breaches the agreement because it would be more privately benefi-
cial to do so (the paradigm problem identified by Schwartz and Scott).
The danger is one of opportunism, although it takes a slightly different
form in which the party who promised to invest simultaneously decides to
delay, whereas in the preliminary precontractual negotiation setting, the
danger is that the promisor will solicit and use information without ever
paying anything for it. In each of these two cases, one party would like to
be able to offer assurances to the counterparty to encourage the
counterparty to continue to invest, without which the counterparty would
be reluctant to invest, especially when the investments are transaction
specific. Promises may lack credibility; there is no way to know how reli-
able or trustworthy the promisor is, nor to know ahead of time what
events will affect the person making a promise, such as one to invest si-
multaneously, and make it unprofitable to keep the promise.265 In the
preliminary negotiation context, the investing party can only make esti-
mates of probabilities regarding the opportunistic proclivities of the other
party. Moreover, the investing party may assume that a promise to com-
pensate for verifiable reliance expenses would be part of their implicit
bargain, since without that protection the promisee would be wary of in-
vesting at all, and that result would not maximize gains from trade.
The identification of a core subset of successful cases in each cate-
gory-both precontractual Hoffman-type paradigm cases and preliminary
agreement cases involving promises to invest simultaneously, together
with the costs of alternative solutions to the investment problem, may
help to explain why and when promissory estoppel and reliance claims
should succeed: namely when the particular danger presented by sequen-
tial investment is present.
Instead of trying to draw connections, Schwartz and Scott have sepa-
rated these types of precontractual and preliminary agreement cases.
They argue that merely because both preliminary agreement cases (in-
volving letters of intent) and precontractual liability cases (the Hoffman-
type case) involve reliance and lack a heterodox bargain that would be
fully enforceable under bargain theory,2 66 "legal doctrines invoked in
preliminary agreement cases are also used to support unrelated claims of
precontractual liability. ' '267 They argue that these types of claims should
be separated to avoid confusion. 268 Consequently, they have focused nar-
rowly on a particular subset of cases in which plaintiffs prevail when they
rely on preliminary agreements. These cases involve the particular form
of opportunism and holdup that occurs when parties agree on a simulta-
neous reliance investment and one defects from the agreement in order
to invest sequentially and enhance private gain.
265. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 686.
266. The preliminary agreements are often incomplete agreements to agree that may be
fully binding or unenforceable depending on the circumstances.
267. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 663 (emphasis added).
268. Id. at 663.
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Other scholars discussing reliance in the courtship period have focused
more broadly on whether liability is needed by analyzing whether and
when a putative promisor is likely to be honest about the probability of a
trade occurring.269 During the course of negotiations, the incentives for
honesty may change. Where natural incentives for honest disclosure ex-
ist, then the law may not need to intervene,270 but where a large incentive
to conceal the actual probabilities of a trade exists, the law may need to
impose liability to ensure more honest revelations.2 71
Each of these scholarly treatments has analyzed why and when reliance
investments should be protected in order to achieve certain goals and
offered powerful reasons for protection in a limited set of cases (where an
agreement regarding promises of simultaneous investment exists) or in a
broader set of cases (if needed to promote honest disclosure regarding
the probability of a trade). 27 2
In fact, it may be possible to see many reliance claims as related if the
underlying problem of hold up is analyzed at each stage of the negotia-
tion process.
This Article does not try to provide a model to rationalize all reliance
cases in all types of contexts-whether they occur pursuant to an agree-
ment regarding the timing of.an investment or whether after a letter of
intent is negotiated. Instead, it suggests that in evaluating precontractual
liability claims, the law ought to pay attention to the particular difficulties
that uncertainty about the future state of the world and the future behav-
ior of one's counterparty poses for promisors who are in the process of
deciding whether to make an offer. The dual problem is that the invest-
ment reliance needed to reduce such uncertainties will also subject the
promisee to the risk of holdup and the concomitant possibility for under-
investment. These considerations suggest that in all types of precontrac-
tual cases, unless the promisor can make a credible commitment to not
act strategically, a legal default rule protecting such reliance and safe-
guarding against holdup is likely to improve welfare. 273 When reliance
cases involve a solicited reliance investment that is linked to a reduction
in uncertainty for the promisor and the promisor is using the reliance to
hedge pending the resolution of the uncertainty, there seems to be a large
disparity in what the promisee is giving up and what the promisor is gain-
ing, and the risk attached to the promisee's investment is linked to factors
affecting the promisor-matters over which the promisee has little con-
trol-the promisee's claim is and should be likely to succeed.
A putative promisor who is deciding whether and on what terms to
commit to an ultimate fully orthodox contract may place great value on
the ability to delay a commitment to the promisee. There are many rea-
269. See generally Johnston, supra note 15.
270. Id. at 491. This is most likely to be the case where the promisor is trying to ensure
that only appropriate counterparties respond to increase the chance of a successful trade.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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sons why a putative promisor might want to delay the point of commit-
ment when he is considering making investments that might be costly to
undo. There might be value in waiting until more information is available
that will shed light on future facts affecting the profitability of the deal or
that will clarify the quality and nature of the promisee with whom the
putative promisor is negotiating. Uncertainty about these matters "might
affect the desirability or timing of the expenditure [of the
promisor] .... *"274
Financial economists have studied the value of a firm obtaining the
flexibility that allows it to hedge with an option. The option allows a firm
to "avoid[] the loss it would have made if it had invested in the first
period and then seen the price go down. '275 The greater the uncertainty
about the future, the more valuable it is to have an option to defer.276 In
fact, the value of the option is lowest when the value of future project is
more certain; then the option worth is close to zero.277 At that point,
when more information is available, the party with the option then simply
decides whether to exercise the option given the price. The value of an
option which allows one to defer investment no longer has much value
once the future is certain.
There are different ways that companies can develop or acquire these
real options to invest. In some cases, the option comes about as a result
of a contract.278 Companies can also achieve flexibility through adopting
technologies that will allow them to make switches in the future, depend-
ing on what developments occur in the future. 279
The key insight 280 from capital investment analyses is that companies
derive great value from the flexibility to postpone investment. Compa-
nies often do not want to commit to begin an irreversible investment until
after they have acquired new information.281 That insight suggested that
former analyses of investment decisions based on net present value were
274. See AVINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCER-
TAINTY 6 (1994). This possibility of waiting for additional information is a factor that might
make a corporation inclined to delay investment by holding onto "an 'option' analogous to
a financial call option-it has the right but not the obligation to buy an asset at some future
time of its choosing." Id.
275. Id. at 10. Those who devised formulas to determine whether investments would be
beneficial for corporations ignored the very real value of "flexibility to deter, abandon, or
otherwise alter a project." LENOS TRIGEORGIS, REAL OPTIONS: MANAGERIAL FLEXIBILITY
AND STRATEGY IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION 7 (1996).
276. DIXIT & PINDYCK, supra note 274, at 13. As Dick Craswell explains, "the option
value of remaining uncommitted is one of all of the costs and benefits (it's a long list) that
goes into answering the question of just when it becomes optimal for one party to become
committed." Email from Richard Craswell, supra note 37; see also Katz, supra note 13, at
1269.
277. Conversation with Professor Emeritus Ronald J. Coffey, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law (Feb. 2008).
278. Trigeorgis gives an example of a contractual option: "Suppose that a large oil com-
pany has a one-year lease to start drilling on undeveloped land with potential oil reserves
for up to a year." TRIGEORGIS, supra note 275, at 9-10.
279. Id. at 13.
280. DIxrr & PINDYCK, supra note 274, at 6.
281. Id.
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inaccurate because they omitted the value that could be obtained by wait-
ing.282 If these insights are applied to the precontractual negotiations
context where uncertainties are great, they suggest two conclusions. First,
if there is a great deal of volatility and uncertainty, promisors do not want
to commit and it may be more valuable to wait. The above should be
powerfully antagonistic to enforcing the ultimate contract. Second, these
insights suggest that there is real value to a putative promisor in having
an option to defer the ultimate contract until more information comes in
or until uncertainty about the quality of the counterparty is reduced.
If there is value to the putative promisor in having an option to invest
until more information comes in, it suggests that the promisor would be
willing to pay for that valuable right of flexibility. That suggests a liability
default rule for the privilege of flexibility might be appropriate if there
are costs associated with explicit options and reason to believe that the
costs of opting out are low (an explicit disclaimer of Section 90 liability).
It may explain why courts seem to be willing to compensate promisees
who invest in a way that affords putative promisors flexibility and permits
the promisors to hedge pending the resolution of uncertainty. Even if the
option is not explicitly paid for, the value that companies attach to the
option to defer suggests that courts may be correct in forcing the putative
promisors to pay for the option.
The default rule protecting reliance in precontractual negotiations can
be connected conceptually to the protection of reliance at other junc-
tures, including the protection of reliance when one party defects from a
promise to invest simultaneously. The protection of reliance investment
shares the common element of protecting against strategic behavior.
At first glance, because the cases involving preliminary agreements
with explicit agreements on simultaneous investment by the parties are
explicit agreements, they may not seem apt analogies to use in determin-
ing whether the law should intervene with a liability rule in precontrac-
tual contexts where no explicit agreements of any kind exist. In
precontractual preliminary negotiations the parties have not reached an
express preliminary agreement nor have they reached an express agree-
ment on the order of investment by each party. By its terms, Schwartz
and Scott's suggested approach would permit judicial intervention in the
form of a liability rule holding one party responsible for the reliance in-
vestment of the other only if there is an express preliminary agreement
and an express agreement on the order of investment.28 3
Schwartz and Scott have provided helpful normative guidance for the
problem of parties acting opportunistically following the establishment of
an agreement by both parties to invest simultaneously, following which
282. Id.
283. Some cases turn on whether specific reference to a future formal agreement would
preclude recognition of an agreement before the achievement of such a formal contract.
Those matters turn on analysis of the parties' intent and contract language, which should
preclude the invocation of an implied bargain.
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one party refuses to invest despite an agreement to do so.284 As the au-
thors point out, one party may have "an incentive to defect from any such
agreement," 285 explaining that "by delaying her decision whether to in-
vest until after the promisee has invested ... [t]he promisor benefits from
defection if the project turns out to be unprofitable because she will not
have sunk costs in a losing deal. '2 86 Parties who defect from an agree-
ment to invest simultaneously when doing so will benefit one of them at
the expense of the other party, will also fail to maximize the parties'
surplus.2 87
Although the precise situations are different and involve reliance oc-
curring at different stages of the negotiation process, the cases and factual
scenarios can be connected by an implied intention to be responsible for
reliance costs of a party who becomes subject to holdup after investing.
A liability rule is needed because otherwise the parties will fear that they
will make themselves worse off by providing the other party with infor-
mation that it can use opportunistically. If the party soliciting investment
may use the information (from the reliance) for its own benefit without
paying for it and without promising to pay for it, the investing party will
be unable to recoup the investment, which will deter investment. That
same deterrent effect will operate in the agreements to invest simultane-
ously-when the investing party worries about defection by his investing
partner and therefore fails to invest, the ex post holdup problem occurs.
Parties will act opportunistically and that may discourage trade unless
parties can control such hazard at a reasonable cost; moral hazard will
occur at all different stages of negotiation. If so, it becomes important to
look beyond the precise factual scenario identified by Schwartz and Scott.
The danger exists whenever one party "has a greater ability than the
other to delay a material portion of her work. '288 The potential for one
party to delay investment exists outside of cases where parties explicitly
agree to invest simultaneously. It also exists when the promisor is solicit-
ing sunk costs from the promisee in order to make determinations about
whether to proceed and if so, on what terms. Because of the relationship
between the promisor and the promisee, in which the promisor is gather-
ing information to formulate the terms of the offer and the promisee
must provide information in the form of investment and sunk costs in
order to enable the putative promisor to proceed to an offer, the prom-
isor is in effect given the discretion to delay making any investments of its
own.289
284. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 666.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Schwartz and Scott assume that there are some instances where simultaneous in-
vestment would maximize surplus, so a defection from that regime would fail to maximize
surplus. See id.
288. Id. at 666 n.il.
289. See id. at 666 n.12.
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In preliminary negotiations, where one party, the promisor, has the
ability to delay investment until the promisee invests as a means of clari-
fying whether a deal that is mutually beneficial even exists, the promisee
is continually subject to the risk that if a bargain is ever reached between
them, it "will reimburse only the promisor's costs."'2 90 Because of a poor
bargaining position that exists when he has sunk costs and the promisor
does not have such costs, the promisee can, following the sinking of such
costs, tell the promisor that he will not proceed but such "threat to exit
unless his investment costs are reimbursed is not credible.
291
For that reason this Article suggests that because the same danger of
moral hazard exists whenever a promisor faces uncertainty about the na-
ture of the ultimate transaction and deliberately delays any investment
until the promisee has invested, a default rule making the promisor re-
sponsible for such solicited verifiable reliance investments would be opti-
mal to avoid the threat of a holdup. This is particularly so where the
promisor has information about itself that affects the probability of a deal
being consummated-information that the promisee lacks access to and
which the promisor may want to conceal-thus impairing the promisee's
ability to decide on the efficiency of the investment.
A discussion of the cases examining this proposition follows.
A. FACTUAL SCENARIOS REPRESENTING SUCCESSFUL CLAIMS
Chrysler Corp. v. Chaplake Holdings, Ltd.292 typifies a class of cases in
which plaintiffs are successful in promissory estoppel claims involving
pre-contractual negotiations without a preliminary agreement.293 The
case illustrates a pattern in which the defendant faces uncertainty about
whether a particular project will succeed. To permit the defendant to pre-
serve the benefit of being positioned to proceed should the project suc-
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. 822 A.2d 1024 (Del. 2003).
293. See also Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 1998); School-Link Tech.,
Inc. v. Applied Res., Inc., 471 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (D. Kan. 2007) (holding that a defendant's
counterclaim for promissory estoppel survives where plaintiff, a vendor that wished to use
defendant's kiosks in a project, was unsure that it could produce the kiosks itself and, in
reliance on plaintiff's promises that defendant would be the sole kiosk supplier, defendant
produced 1500 kiosks); Roeder v. Pacificorp Fin. Servs., Inc., No. CV-05-1578-ST, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79996 (D. Or. Oct. 27, 2006) (holding defendant's counterclaim for
promissory estoppel survives where counterparty, uncertain whether a new project would
be successful, told claimant "to go back and work hard" and promissory estoppel claimant,
believing that he would be receiving a long term incentive plan, took on compensation at
below market value, traveled significantly, and worked long hours); Tour Costa Rica v.
Country Walkers, Inc., 758 A.2d 795 (Vt. 2000) (affirming a promissory estoppel claim
where defendant was able to gauge the interest in Costa Rican tours with minimal expense
since plaintiff did all the work and plaintiff's investment allowed defendant to gauge viabil-
ity of the area as a tour site). See also older cases in this line, Esquire Radio & Elecs., Inc.
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 804 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1986) (allowing recovery on promissory
estoppel where plaintiff relied on assurances of defendant to import and store product for
ultimate repurchase and scheme allowed defendant to deal with uncertainty as to future
quantities needed); Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 144 A.2d 123 (1958).
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ceed, the defendant solicits sunk cost reliance investments by the
plaintiff. Those sunk costs provide significant benefits to the defendant
by allowing it to hedge pending the resolution of the uncertainty about
the project. It gives the defendant the benefit of insuring that it will be
well positioned to proceed if the project goes ahead. In a sense, the
plaintiff's sunk cost earns the defendant the ability to proceed, a kind of
option, but one that the defendant does not pay for expressly.
In Chrysler v. Chaplake Holdings, the plaintiff had an exclusive right to
sell high end Lamborghini cars in a broad market that included the Chan-
nel Islands, the U.K., and Ireland.294 Although the plaintiff only sold
thirty cars annually, that small number still earned it the honor of being
the "largest Lamborghini dealer in the world, '295 given the total annual
sales of 250 cars.
During the 1980s, Chrysler developed an expansion plan that would
increase production from 250 to 5,000 units per year by doubling the
number of high end Lamborghinis produced and also bringing on a new,
lower priced, model that would achieve higher volume sales. The top
management of Chrysler was involved in the expansion plan and "had
absolute control" over it.296 Chrysler wanted to reach the goal of produc-
ing 5,000 cars per year 297 within a five year window. However, there was
uncertainty at Chrysler about how long the plan would take to achieve
the goal298 and whether the goal was in fact achievable. 299 Chrysler was
concerned that even if it ratcheted up the production of low and high end
Lamborghinis, the dealer network might not be able to handle an in-
creased number. To alleviate the uncertainty about whether the plan
would fail if the dealership capacity for selling a larger number of cars
faltered, Chrysler assured the plaintiff that it would maintain its exclusive
dealership only if it took steps to demonstrate an increased ability to han-
dle a larger volume of cars.300
After a Chrysler representative reiterated its assurance that the plain-
tiff's exclusive rights would depend on its ability to expand the capacity of
its dealership to handle larger volume, the plaintiff developed a plan with
its Credit Suisse bankers. The plaintiff's plan included a series of steps to
facilitate the handling of a larger volume of cars including adding staff,
increasing showroom size in various locations, and making other capital
improvements. Credit Suisse also authorized an increase in its overdraft
facility to fund the plaintiff's plan.301 In early 1990, after the plaintiff had
built a new distribution center, acquired new facilities, secured financing,
294. 822 A.2d. at 1027.
295. Id. at 1028.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1029 (detailing lacocca's extension of the time frame for expansion from five
to six years).
299. One Chrysler representative testified that "'if and when we get to 3,000 a year'
then Chrysler might consider expanding its existing dealer network." Id. at 1028 n.4.
300. Id. at 1028.
301. Id. at 1029.
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and added staff, a representative of Chrysler endorsed the plan. 302
During this time period certain factors, including an economic down-
turn, cast doubt on the wisdom of Chrysler's proceeding with its expan-
sion plan, particularly the lower cost Lamborghini.30 3 Chrysler started to
explore "an exit strategy" 30 4 due to increased doubts about its own plan's
feasibility but continued to offer assurances to the plaintiff that "produc-
tion for both the Diablo [high end] and the P140 [low end] was on
schedule. "305
Despite the assurances, Chrysler delayed production, and ultimately
the delays in production "eroded . . . profitability" for the plaintiff.30 6
These delays deprived the plaintiff of an income stream that could help
service its debt obligations and the bank called the plaintiff's loan 307 that
had been taken out to fund the expansion.
A jury found for the plaintiff on its promissory estoppel claim. This
judgment was affirmed on appeal.308 This result makes sense because it
involved a number of factors that make success more likely and defensi-
ble as a normative matter. The case involved significant uncertainty
about the future, which the defendant was trying to hedge by soliciting
significant sunk costs from the plaintiff. Those sunk costs provided signif-
icant benefit to the defendant by helping to position the defendant to
take advantage of a future lucrative opportunity once the uncertainty was
resolved. By soliciting the sunk costs, the defendant gained an option to
proceed but without paying for that privilege. The sunk cost investments
by the plaintiff were also useful in helping to distinguish the plaintiff as an
able player in the future opportunity. The plaintiff's sunk cost subjected
it to the possibility of a hold up. Once the investments were sunk, the
plaintiff would lose the investment altogether if no deal materialized. But
more importantly, the sequential investment subjected the plaintiff to the
risk that should a deal materialize, the plaintiff would be subject to the
defendant's ability to capture part of the investment in the bargained-for
surplus. This case is representative of other similar cases, which are often
successful claims for plaintiffs and have been overlooked in the scholarly
literature.
Taylor Box Co. v. SAR Group Ltd.30 9 is another example of a plaintiff
prevailing on a promissory estoppel claim in the context of negotiations
without a preliminary agreement or contract. The defendant faced uncer-
tainties as to whether or not a particular box design would be desired by
the client, and whether a better box could be produced quickly enough to
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1030.
304. Id. at 1030 n.6.
305. Id. at 1030.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 1038.
309. Taylor Box Co. v. SAR Group Ltd., No. 2002-1033, 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 7, at
*18-19 (Super. Ct. R.I. Mar. 25, 2005).
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meet a deadline. The defendant solicited sunk costs from the plaintiff by
authorizing the plaintiff to start the manufacturing process for a custom
box. The court viewed promissory estoppel as an alternative to a breach
of contract claim.310
The plaintiff, Taylor Box, was a custom box manufacturing company.
The defendant, Audette, approached Taylor Box and its president, Daniel
J. Shedd, about making a "better value" DVD box for its customer. 311
The parties met in April of 2001, and the defendant made it clear in this
meeting that the project was urgent. Audette specified that he "needed
the product by mid-June. '312
Over the next week, Taylor Box made a prototype box, looked into
pricing,313 and provided quotes. Audette, by his actions, conveyed to
Taylor Box that a deal was imminent.31 4 The defendant ordered 2,000
boxes, referenced a time period when it expected the plaintiff to deliver,
and agreed to a one-time setup charge in order to develop the specialty
dies that Taylor Box needed to produce the boxes. The plaintiff immedi-
ately ordered the material needed to produce the boxes and apprised the
defendant of the order for the material. 31 5 Shedd, a representative of the
plaintiff, testified that Audette told him that the defendant's client had
"approved the design. '316 Audette admitted in court, however, that he
never secured the contract with his customer and that he did not reveal
that fact to the plaintiff.31 7
After the mid-June delivery date had passed, Audette continued to
make comments that led Taylor Box to believe that the project was still
going forward. In July, however, Audette indicated to the plaintiff that
"the project was going forward but it was a budget issue with his cli-
ent.''318 The plaintiff did not hear anything more from Audette, and in
October, sent over a $10,000 cancellation charge. 319 Audette indicated
that he would refuse to pay the cancellation charge and, indeed, it was
never paid.320
Audette contended that because he understood that he would need to
put down a fifty percent deposit to have a contract with Taylor Box, and
he had not done so, there was no contract. 321 Audette also claimed that it
was his understanding nothing could happen with the contract until his
client approved a preproduction sample, in addition to the prototype that
310. Id. at *9.
311. Id. at *2.
312. Id. at *1-2.
313. Id. at *2-3.
314. Id. at *3 (delivery within 4-6 weeks contemplated).
315. Id. at *4.
316. Id. at *3-4.
317. Id. at *6.
318. Id. at *8.
319. Id. at *9.
320. Id. at *7-10.
321. Id. at *9.
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had already been approved. 322 The Rhode Island Superior Court did not
believe Audette's view of the facts because it would have been unreason-
able to require Taylor Box to set up an entire manufacturing line before
having a contract. 323
Taylor Box sued Audette for breach of contract, seeking $28,000.324
The court noted that the plaintiff brought an alternative claim of detri-
mental reliance.3 25 "Although not so stated, this [was] essentially a claim
based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel. ' '326
In a non-jury trial, the judge found for the plaintiff Taylor Box on the
basis of promissory estoppel and ordered judgment in the amount of
$10,960.35.327 The plaintiff had a clear and unambiguous promise of an
eventually perfected contract and the repeated promises that the deal
would go forward. 328
There were many uncertainties that affected the negotiations in this
case. The defendant lacked experience with the production of specialty
boxes329 and was uncertain as to whether Taylor Box could produce a box
that was satisfactory to its customer. Apparently Audette was uncertain
that its customer would even want a new box, matters over which the
plaintiff would have little control and little advance knowledge. While
these uncertainties were being resolved, the defendant solicited sunk
costs from Taylor Box in starting the project. In reliance upon the defen-
dant's willingness to pay set up costs and ongoing assurances, the plaintiff
moved forward with production.3 30 The defendant stood to benefit be-
cause he had a dedicated company-Taylor Box-working on the boxes
under an expedited time frame.
The plaintiff's sunk costs subjected it to holdup possibility because it
would lose the investment altogether if no deal materialized and would
have to share the surplus with the defendant if a deal were consum-
mated-and a deal would not materialize unless the plaintiff began the
work. The urgent tone of the meeting clearly caused Taylor Box to be-
lieve that it needed to start the project quickly or risk losing the possible
contract. As a result of ongoing assurances, Taylor Box "kept the project
'alive' for about six months. '33 1 It was not possible to return the materi-
als after such time, because many of the items were transaction spe-
cific. 332 Thus, the court's finding, imposing liability for the plaintiffs, was
an appropriate result. It mitigated the problems of holdup and reduced
trade that would otherwise occur if there were no contractually negoti-
322. Id. at *6.
323. Id. at *6 n.1.
324. Id. at *9.
325. Id. at *9-10.
326. Id. at *10.
327. Id. at *19.
328. Id. at *18-19.
329. Id. at *4-5.
330. Id. at *7.
331. Id. at *18.
332. Id. at *18.
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ated protection, no evidence of a small community with actions transpar-
ent enough to serve as the basis for reputational or other non-judicial
sanctions, and no evidence that "there are private strategies and natural
incentives (i.e., all the mechanisms of implicit--that is, not judicially en-
forceable-contracting) that might adjust matters between those who are
economically bestowing benefits on one another. For example, the op-
tions may be reciprocal. ' '333 In such cases if the parties have not each
taken pre-commitment actions that might form the basis for a kind of
implicit contract that rests on the assumption that "'I'm gaining as much
as I'm giving,"' 334 there might be reason for judicial intervention.
B. CASES FROM OTHER DOCTRINAL AREAS
THAT PROTECT RELIANCE
An example of a case in which a court protects pre-contractual reliance
investments that are solicited by the putative offeror but under a different
(non-promissory estoppel rubric) is Earhart v. William Low Co.335
Though decided on a theory of quantum meruit, the case ended by pro-
tecting the investments made by the plaintiff on the basis of assurances by
the defendant and thus is similar to cases decided under promissory es-
toppel. The investments were solicited by the defendant during a period
of uncertainty. 336 The defendant did not know about certain matters, in-
cluding whether a second tract of land could be acquired in addition to
the initial tract and whether financing would be obtainable. 337 Neverthe-
less, the reliance investment solicited by the defendant during this period
of uncertainty was valuable and allowed the defendant to avoid forfeiting
the permit to build, which might have occurred unless the plaintiff took
certain steps, including making an investment on the second tract.
338
In that case, a contractor began work on the construction of a trailer
park at the request of the defendant. 339 The defendant owned one tract
of land and was negotiating for the acquisition of a second tract owned by
a third party.340 The defendant negotiated a contract of construction with
the plaintiff that would employ the plaintiff to construct the park on both
tracts of land. 34 1 The contract would not become binding until the defen-
dant secured financing for the project, and the second tract would not
belong to the defendant without that financing.342
333. Ronald J. Coffey, Email from Professor Emeritus of Law, Case Western Law
School to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Law School (May 7, 2008,
15:04 CST) (on file with author).
334. Id.
335. Earhart v. William Low Co., 600 P.2d 1344 (Cal. 1979).
336. Id. at 1345.
337. Id. at 1346.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 1345.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 1346.
342. Id.
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During the period when the defendant was unsure whether it would
secure the financing on the second tract, the defendant learned from the
plaintiff that the ability to build a trailer park on the second tract owned
by the third party might expire unless construction on the trailer park
began.343 The defendant then requested that the plaintiff begin work on
the mobile home park. 344 The defendant did not know at that juncture
whether it would acquire the second tract of land, or whether it would get
the financing, but one can see why the defendant may have wanted the
plaintiff to invest money in construction. The plaintiff's investment
helped to preserve the right to build the mobile home park, and that may
in turn have been important in helping to secure the financing by making
the project viable.
After the plaintiff had commenced work, the defendant refused to pay
the plaintiff for the work done, citing the hiring of another contractor as
an excuse. 345 When the plaintiff sued in quantum meruit, it faced a partic-
ularly difficult problem: the work on the second tract, since it did not
belong to the defendant but to a third party, did not directly benefit the
defendant and so might not be recoverable under a quantum meruit the-
ory.3 4 6 Normally quantum meruit would require that which is to be dis-
gorged as an unjust enrichment benefit the defendant, who could argue
that the benefit was to a third party, not to the defendant.347
The court nevertheless found a benefit to the defendant, basing its de-
cision on an "extraordinarily broad concept of benefit" 348 developed in
the case law that looked to the theory "that performance at another's
request may itself constitute a benefit. '349 In reaching that conclusion
and rejecting the narrow concept of "direct benefit" that the trial court
had applied, the court looked to a dissenting opinion by Chief Justice
Traynor of the California Supreme Court, in which he argued that direct
benefit should not be the governing issue.350 Chief Justice Traynor advo-
cated a rule granting a plaintiff quantum meruit recovery as one that ap-
propriately "places the loss where it belongs-on the party whose
requests induced performance in justifiable reliance on the belief that the
requested performance would be paid for. '351
Although Professor Farnsworth may be correct that the notion of bene-
fit applied in Earhart is "artificial, ' 352 the case may be more important if
one thinks of Earhart as part of a larger group of cases in which courts
protect a party who relies in a way that benefits the other party, even if
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 1344.
346. Id. at 1347.
347. Id.
348. Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 224.
349. Earhart, 600 P.2d at 1348.
350. Id. at 1350.
351. Id. at 1350-51 (citing Coleman Eng'g Co. v. N. Am. Aviation, Inc., 420 P.2d 713,
729 (1966)).
352. Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 224.
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no direct tangible benefit exists, because of the problem that solicited
investments pose in terms of opportunistic behavior and hold up. Unless
those investments, which are solicited during a period of uncertainty for
the defendant, and which may help the defendant hedge or reduce uncer-
tainty, are compensated, future parties may decline to invest and putative
offerors will be deprived of needed information.
Maybe Earhart was a stretch doctrinally when it expanded quantum
meruit to include a case in which the only direct benefit was to a third
party. However, the case makes sense in the context of the danger of
hold up and the incentive problem created when investments are solicited
by a party as a way of helping the non-investing party hedge and then not
compensated or reimbursed by a liability rule. Without a liability rule to
cover cases like Earhart, future parties may be unwilling to invest and the
risk of uncontrolled opportunism will act as a drag on future trades. Sim-
ilar arguments can be made to support promissory estoppel liability in
pre-contractual negotiation cases, even those that do not involve a tradi-
tional "agreement."
C. WHAT THE SCHWARTZ AND SCOTT PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT
CASES TEACH Us ABOUT THE HOLD UP PROBLEM IN
PRECONTRACTUAL HOFFMAN TYPE CASES
As noted above, Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott have suggested that
reliance investments that occur following a preliminary agreement where
the parties, as part of their preliminary agreement, promise to invest si-
multaneously and one party subsequently defers that investment in a way
that disadvantages the other party, should be compensable.35 3 The delay
is often considered by courts to be a breach of the duty of good faith that
applies to preliminary agreements, and the promisee should be able to-
and is under the case law-able to recover its reliance expenses.
354
It may be useful to examine the cases considered by Schwartz and Scott
illustrating protection for investment reliance following a binding prelimi-
nary agreement in order to see if there is a common justificative frame-
work that can explain or justify when the law should intervene to protect
reliance investments, particularly where the danger of sequential invest-
ment is present. In both reliance following a preliminary agreement and
reliance in preliminary negotiation, uncertainty hampers the ability to
reach a fully contingent contract that would protect all reliance invest-
ments and transaction costs prevent bargaining over reliance investments
since they remain non-contractible. 355
To illustrate how the obligation of good faith operates to protect reli-
ance in the period following a preliminary agreement Schwartz and Scott
chose to analyze Kandel v. Center for Urological Treatment and Re-
353. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 662.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 665.
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search.356 In that case the plaintiff, a doctor, joined the defendant's urol-
ogy practice.357 The plaintiff's employment contract with the practice
obligated both parties to negotiate in good faith at the end of one year
toward an agreement that would permit the plaintiff to buy a one-third
share in the practice through an acquisition of shares in the corporation
owning the practice. 358
After the year expired, the parties negotiated but could not reach an
agreement on terms.35 9 The plaintiff argued that the defendant had not
bargained in good faith because of the amount that the corporation
would require the plaintiff to pay to the corporation on termination of his
employment. 360 The legal question for the court was whether the defen-
dant had breached its good faith obligation when it negotiated but failed
to reach terms.361
In deciding whether the court's decision to deny relief to the doctor
was appropriate, Schwartz and Scott considered whether either of the
parties breached an obligation to invest simultaneously in the success of
the enterprise and whether, even if both parties complied with their obli-
gation to invest simultaneously, either could be found to have violated of
the obligation of good faith that would govern a binding preliminary
agreement. 362 The court had to consider what the scope of good faith
entailed when the parties were negotiating the terms of a buy-in of the
new partner to the corporation. To determine the scope of the obligation
of good faith and whether it was breached, Schwartz and Scott rightly
focused on the difficulties of contracting and the risks that each party
faced ex ante when the corporation hired the doctor.363 Those difficulties
in turn explained why it was not possible or optimal for the parties to
reach a fully contingent contract that fixed the terms of an ultimate buy-
in for the new physician immediately upon the hiring of a new doctor.
Each side needed to invest further in order to resolve uncertainties and
contribute toward the success of the new partner's contribution. Uncer-
tainty ex ante would make it unclear whether the new partner would in
fact be worthwhile enough to bring in as a full fledged partner. Asym-
metric information problems meant that the corporation lacked informa-
tion about how valuable the prospective partner was, and the prospective
partner did not know how valuable a practice he was potentially join-
ing.364 To deal with these uncertainties, the parties put off the negotia-
tion of the ultimate agreement until the end of the first year but
356. Id. at 694.
357. Kandel v. Ctr. for Urological Treatment and Research, P.C., No. M2000-02128-
COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 598567, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2002).
358. This obligation to bargain in good faith was explicit. Id. at *1.
359. Id. at *1.
360. Id. at *2.
361. Id. at *4.





committed to invest right away.365 The advantage of postponing the final
agreement was that some of the uncertainties and asymmetries would
have been resolved; the corporation would know how much value the
partner could bring to the practice and the partner would have better
information about the value of joining this practice (as distinct from other
practices).
Given those difficulties, postponement of a final agreement served
many purposes. The corporation could postpone a decision about the fi-
nal terms until the final worth of the prospective member of the corpora-
tion had been revealed over time. Because each party met its obligation
to invest simultaneously in the practice, Schwartz and Scott agree with
the court that there was no breach of the good faith obligation.366
The legal issue in Kandel was whether the corporation breached its ob-
ligation of good faith when it offered certain terms that the doctor/pro-
spective member of the corporation found objectionable. 367 Because the
value that the plaintiff would bring to the practice was uncertain ex ante,
the defendant would have been unwilling to set the terms of the ultimate
contract of buy-in terms for the plaintiff ex ante. H6wever, the defendant
and the plaintiff were both willing to invest simultaneously in the interim
and to obligate themselves to attempt to work out final terms after some
of that uncertainty was resolved in the first year of practice. 368 The court
found no breach. Schwartz and Scott explained that such an outcome is
justifiable because each party was committed to furnish certain invest-
ments simultaneously and each party performed its obligation to invest in
the practice.369 The corporation invested in training the doctor/plaintiff,
who in turn made an investment of human capital. 370 Since neither party
failed to invest, neither party was subject to holdup, as would have been
the case, Schwartz and Scott argued, if the practice had failed to invest in
training even after the doctor has undertaken the sunk cost of moving.371
Since each party met its obligations to invest simultaneously, the doctor
could not successfully argue that the corporation had breached its duty of
good faith.372 The corporation had an obligation not to withhold an in-
vestment in such a way that would subject the other party to holdup, but
if the corporation invested in training, it was not obligated to reach an
agreement with the doctor. Extending good faith to obligate the corpora-
tion to reach an agreement with the doctor would shield the doctor from
a risk that he undertook ex ante. It was possible that after each party
invested, the preliminary agreement would not be finalized because it no
longer seemed profitable, but the parties should not be insulated from
365. Kandel, 2002 WL 598567, at *1.
366. Schwarcz & Scott, supra note 19, at 696.
367. Kandel, 2002 WL 598567, at *7 (describing the offered terms).
368. Id. at *1.
369. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 695.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 696.
372. Id. at 695.
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such risk, and so the good faith obligation should not be interpreted to
mandate agreement on terms.373
The authors thus suggested that where there is a promise to invest si-
multaneously and one party delays investment, a cause of action should
lie because of the possibility that one party will be subject to hold up by
the other party. 374 To prevent that outcome and to encourage invest-
ment, liability should obtain when there is delayed investment that sub-
jects the other party to holdup. Where the parties invested
simultaneously but failed to reach agreement on the ultimate terms,375 as
in Kandel, no cause of action should lie because liability is not necessary
to induce efficient investment. What is needed to induce efficient invest-
ment is legal protection against a particular form of holdup-that of a
delay in investment by one when each agreed to invest simultaneously. If
the plaintiff is protected against that, there is no need to protect him
against the risk that the parties will fail to reach a final contract. One of
the risks that the plaintiff assumed was that his work in the practice over
a year's duration would demonstrate that even with training from his em-
ployer, he did not appear to be a desirable partner.
In the cases at the center of this Article, no preliminary agreement on
the type or order of investment that each party will make existed, in part
because it was too early to even agree on a preliminary agreement. Thus,
if one applies the insight of Schwartz and Scott literally, it would suggest
that there should not be liability for reliance investments made during the
pre-contractual period where there is no preliminary agreement and no
agreement on a sequence of investments. 376 The particular rule sug-
gested by Schwartz and Scott and examined in cases like Kandel, permit-
ting a promisee to recover sunk costs "if his promisor deviated from an
agreed investment sequence" 377 would not technically apply to a prelimi-
nary negotiation which lacks a preliminary agreement or an agreement to
invest. Nevertheless, there is a similar danger of holdup when one party
is solicited to invest in ways that benefit the other party, often by reduc-
ing uncertainty about whether a transaction would be profitable. For that
reason the law should look to the underlying logic of the Schwartz and
Scott analysis that protects an investing promisee against a situation
"when [d]efection from a preliminary agreement to invest simultaneously
thus disadvantages the promisee. ' 378 The logic suggests that the law
should compensate parties for reliance investments made in precontrac-
tual negotiations when doing so would protect the investing party from
373. Id. at 696.
374. Id. at 686-87.
375. This would likely be the case where the investment demonstrated that the doctor's
worth was not as high as expected. Id. at 696. This would demonstrate "that trade was
inefficient ex post." Id. at 696 n.97.
376. That outcome would be consistent with many cases that hold there is no obligation
of good faith that applies in the preliminary negotiation phase to protect reliance. There
are some notable exceptions to this principle.
377. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19, at 667.
378. Id. at 666.
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the holdup risk that occurs should one party invest first. In the precon-
tractual early negotiation cases there is no expectation that there will be
simultaneous investment. Instead, the party deciding whether to formu-
late an offer (the promisor) is delaying investment until it can determine
if a full-fledged offer should be made. Because there is no agreement or
promise to invest simultaneously, the delay in investment by the putative
offeror is not a breach of any explicit promise nor does it specifically fall
within the scope of cases subject to Schwartz and Scott's admonition that
delays of agreements to invest simultaneously following a preliminary
agreement should entitle the other party to recover. Nevertheless, the
prior investment by the promisee should be protected to achieve the goal
of efficient investment and prevent hold up; otherwise, there will be un-
derinvestment and fewer trades, especially if the promisee's lack of
knowledge about the promisor's project makes pricing a bargain over the
investment costly.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the precontractual negotiation period for
two purposes: (1) to examine whether a liability rule making one party
responsible for the reliance costs of the investing party is justified; and (2)
to ascertain whether the case law outcomes are consistent with such a
rule. To determine whether a liability rule is justified, the Article has
examined how the problem of incomplete contracting, uncertainty, and
sequential investment all contribute to the conclusion that without a lia-
bility rule, reliance would be suboptimal. Uncertainty about the future
makes it hard to reach a complete contract, without which one party may
be reluctant to invest, since the investment will be lost if the deal does not
materialize, the contract itself will not offer complete protection because
the investment may be non-contractible, and the investment by one party
because of the sequential nature of the investment can subject the invest-
ing party to holdup by the other party. If a contract ultimately is formed,
the non-investing party may capture part of the surplus, leaving an inade-
quate incentive in the other party to invest.
Traditionally, the law nonetheless denied all recovery to an investing
party if there was no contract. Following the adoption of Section 90,
courts took a more liberal view and found liability even absent a full-
fledged bargain. Hoffman v. Red Owl represented the "high-water
mark" for such liability.3 79
Recently, two scholars, Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott, have argued
that the case law demonstrates that courts deny recovery in preliminary
negotiations unless there is an agreement, but do impose liability and
grant reliance recoveries when the parties achieve a preliminary agree-
ment which includes an agreement to invest simultaneously, and one
379. See generally Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965); IAN
AYRES & RICHARD SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACr 462 (2008).
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party subsequently delays investing for strategic reasons.380
These two authors have drawn a strong line between precontractual
negotiation where claims fail and reliance following preliminary agree-
ments where claims succeed. This Article has challenged the conclusion
that precontractual negotiation claims fail absent a showing that an
agreement exists. In so doing the Article rationalizes both sets of cases
into a unifying justificative theory in which the law protects reliance in
both sets of factual scenarios at different stages of the negotiation if the
law can mitigate the effects of opportunistic hold up through a liability
rule.
380. See generally Schwartz & Scott, supra note 19.
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